CANADIAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

A Quarterly of Christian Thought

Vol. VII, No. 3 July, 1961

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Subscriptions should be sent to the University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5. Cheques in payment of subscriptions should be made out to University of Toronto Press, payable at par in Toronto.

Subscription Rates

Regular	*Students*
One year $5.00	One Year $1.50
Two Years $5.00	Two Years $3.00

Single issues $1.00

Editorial

"...OUT OF HIS TREASURE THINGS NEW AND OLD"

THE VERB "to teach," like so many of the other verbs involved in the pastoral ministry, takes a double object. Something must be taught to somebody. This is one of the basic problems in the communication of the Christian faith both in the realm of theological education and in the parish ministry. In a theological college, it is possible to over-emphasize either the something or the somebody. There is a tension and dilemma because a theological college is both an academic institution dedicated to high standards and integrity in its scholarship and also a training school for the pastoral ministry to which most of its graduates will go. In pastoral courses, it is difficult to involve students in a realistic manner with the parish ministry, and too often courses degenerate into courses *about* the pastoral ministry drawing upon the past experience of the lecturer.

In the colleges, many efforts are being made to achieve a greater integration of the academic and the practical training of their students. Clinical training and a more effective use of field work are both areas where we may look for help. The replacing of "practical" lectures by seminars in the college instruction may be also of service. The introduction of the tape recorder, films and studies of case histories can help, but even here we operate in an unreal situation. The temptation is to give answers on the basis of rule and law, and pastoral concern is not communicated effectively. In some sense the minister only becomes a minister when he is involved in a pastoral situation where he, and he alone, can and must do the ministering.

This dilemma of communicating something to somebody is not only a problem for the colleges. It is a problem in the parish ministry too. The eternal Gospel—the givens of the faith—must be made relevant, alive and saving to these people in this parish at this time and in the context of their present needs. It is the same dilemma. In a Confirmation class or classes for "joining the Church," the clergyman will want to get across certain given information about God, the faith, the Church, ethics and so on. He must teach *about* God, but he must also help these persons to meet and to know God. To know the catechism *in toto* may not be an adequate preparation, but not to know anything of the catechism may be even worse. To preach a sermon, to teach a lesson, to direct a discussion involves the priest or minister in this task of communicating something to someone. Knowing does not make a Christian—but being and doing.

This journal suffers from a lack of articles on the strategy used at the local parish level to meet this dilemma. This issue carries an article by

Professor Jay on a strategy of parish ministry with emphasis on the preparation and follow up of Baptism. He suggests that a parish ministry can be centred in the ministry of this primary sacrament. Professor Jay's article recognizes the acute problem of time in a parish. There are more things to be done than the clergyman can do. The question is not always what needs to be done, or what it would be desirable to do, but which, of the many things that he can actually do, is the most important and makes the greatest claim on his time and energy.

This generation has seen in the colleges a great flurry of courses related to personal ministries and the techniques of pastoral counselling. There is something unrealistic here. There is obviously not time enough to minister effectively in the parish in a one-to-one relationship. It is impractical and too often an escape from the real job. We need to see the Church as a fellowship and community—creative, saving, healing, and the place of meeting between God and his people and through his people, where God reaches out to the unchurched. The Church is the society in which redemption is happening, but more than that, it is the redeeming society. In the words of Richard Cabot, it is the "growing edge" of the Kingdom.

Much more thought and study needs to be given to the use of groups—the dynamics, relations and interaction of persons—in the communication of a real, lively Christian faith and practice. The answer is not necessarily a proliferation of clubs, societies and organizations. The Church itself is *the* group, community or fellowship expressing itself in worship and love, concern and service. A careful balance is needed, for what we do must be based firmly on what we believe. Pastoral strategy without theology may well descend into gimmicks but it is no less true that theology without pastoral concern, imagination and ingenuity can be cold, irrelevant and ineffective. We invite our readers in the pastoral ministry to share their insights on this crucial area of concern.

H.W.B.

Preaching the Gospel Today

W. NORMAN PITTENGER

WHEN a man is ordained to the sacred ministry in any of the Reformed Churches—and this includes the Anglican Communion, which even the staunchest defenders of its "catholicity" must acknowledge is a "reformed" catholic communion—a form of words is used in which the centrality of the preaching office in that ministry is affirmed. It was customary among the Reformers themselves to speak of a "valid" ministry as one in which "the pure Word of God is preached and the Sacraments be duly administered according to Christ's ordinance" (to quote the Anglican XXXIX Articles, which are paralleled in other and similar "confessions"); and the history of the ministry in the Christian Church as a whole makes it abundantly clear that "authority to preach the Word of God," or the right to "dispense the Word of God," or the giving to the candidate of the Church's recognition and authority to be "preacher of the Gospel"—all these are more or less synonomous phrases—has been an integral part of ordination.

There are many differences between the various Christian bodies which emerged from the reformation in the sixteenth century—differences in theology and differences in order—but the importance of the preaching office is one point in which they all agree. All of them insist that among the functions of an ordained man, one of the most important roles, although not the only important one, is that he is to preach the "word of God" which is the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ.

The minister certainly is not *only* a preacher; and we may regret that many who ought to know better have been content to use that one word to describe his work. The administration of the Church's sacraments is equally important; and this is especially true for us if we accept the position of the sixteenth-century reformers that in the celebration of the sacraments of Baptism and Holy Communion, as well as in the pulpit, the gospel is proclaimed and expressed. In fact, we may rightly claim that the preaching of the gospel and the administration of the sacraments must necessarily go together; to put it in language used by Professor Whitehead in *Religion in the Making*, the "cult" (by which Whitehead meant the social action of worship) and the "myth" (by which he meant the story which explains a society's worship) can never be separated. It is the intimate and indissoluble union of the two which prevents preaching from becoming merely a hortatory exercise or a public address, and which prevents the sacrament from being merely routine with suggestions which might seem to border on "magic."

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In another context we should have much to say about the Holy Communion; but in this paper it is the preaching of the word with which we are concerned. And I must admit frankly that it may seem presumptuous for one whose whole ministry has been spent in theological teaching to speak on the subject at all. Those who minister regularly in the Church's congregations have a much more immediate experience of what it means to be a preacher than do those of us who are engaged in academic work. Yet it may be that, entirely apart from the preaching of the gospel in which any theological teacher does in fact from time to time engage outside the walls of his school, his experience in teaching those who are to be clergy of the Church, and in my own particular case a special concern for the "apologetic" of "gospelling," can be of some help to those who are in the parish ministry, and who are forced to consider with utmost seriousness the obligation in this matter of preaching the gospel which their ordination lays upon them.

So we come to the question which must trouble every man who is ordained: Why is it that so much preaching is without power? I think the answer to this question cannot be found, as is often claimed, in the inadequacies of the minister so far as his rhetorical skill, his use of apt illustrations, his logical development of theme, and so forth, are in view. These are important matters, of course; and no minister should venture into the pulpit without adequate preparation for his task, the use of whatever elocutionary techniques he can learn, and the employment of the pointed illustration which will bring his sermon to life for his hearers. But the real explanation of our ineffectual preaching lies much deeper. I believe it begins from a failure on our part. Far too many of us, far too much of the time, do not recognize the terrible truth that as preachers we are engaged in nothing other than the task of confronting our listeners with the very word of God. I think that we do not recognize sufficiently clearly that in the human words which we use our listeners are to hear not so much what *we* say, as what *God* says to them through us. We do not see with sufficient clarity that, as those who have been set apart by Christ in his Church for the work of the ministry, we are "stewards of the mysteries of God," who are commissioned to bring his word or revelation to his people and in his name to pronounce the message of salvation.

All too much of the time, I am afraid, we consider our preaching to be an exercise in theological teaching, in moral exhortation, or in pious meditation. There is room for each of these in our ministry, as I shall attempt to show. But none of these things is what is meant by *preaching the gospel.* It matters not whether we be conservative or liberal, traditionalist or modernist; in whatever category we may be placed, or place ourselves, the fact remains that in so far as we are Christian ministers, ordained by Christ in his Church to be his ministering agents, our *preaching* can be nothing other than the proclamation of God's word for the wholeness of men. And once this recognition is at the heart of our ministry, our preaching

will become effectual—not that we are ever more than unworthy and "unprofitable" servants, but that God in Christ can and does use our unworthiness for his own great ends and makes even our imperfections to serve him.

I have been speaking of "the gospel." What *is* this gospel which we are to preach? This is the question which will engage our attention for the remainder of this lecture. In attempting to answer it, I should like to make some highly important preliminary distinctions, by saying what the gospel is *not*. Often we can come to the positive truth by considering and rejecting inadequate or false ideas, and perhaps nowhere is this so useful as in the subject we have under consideration.

First of all, the gospel is *not* simply the teaching of Jesus, particularly when this is understood as denoting his religious and moral admonitions and exhortations. There can be no doubt, of course, that the teaching of our Lord is of enormous significance, not only for its own intrinsic value but also because it enables us to understand the kind of person that Jesus himself was, humanly speaking. Many years ago, Dr. Frank Russell Barry, the present Bishop of Southwell, wrote a book entitled *The Relevance of Christianity*. In that book he made the point that the teaching of Jesus—his words as reported to us in the New Testament—has its peculiar importance for us in that it shows "who Jesus was" in terms of "what Jesus said." As we all know, it is frequently possible for us to determine a man's character, his quality of life, his way of being a man, by listening to what he has to say. We comment about him that he is the *sort of man* who says things like that. An American illustration would be Abraham Lincoln; it is not only the things that Lincoln did, but also the things that he said and (in this modern instance) the things that he wrote in letters and state papers, that make it possible for us to know the kind of man that he really was. And when the words that a man says are confirmed by the testimony of a life in agreement with them, we may well come to know that man and his personal quality in a very deep and real way. So it is with Jesus.

Yet it remains true that the gospel, the good news which the Church proclaims, is not in itself simply what Jesus said. What he said may be paralleled very largely in the teaching of the rabbis of his time and later. As Wellhausen once remarked, everything that Jesus said (save, I think, his teaching about God's "seeking the lost") can be found in the highest and best Jewish teaching; although Wellhausen had to add that much more may be found in this teaching which Jesus eliminated or rejected—our Lord's human genius here, if the word may be used, was in his selectivity. But it is still the fact that the early Church did not go out into the world proclaiming the teaching of a great Jewish rabbi. It remembered and taught what Jesus had said about God and man, about the Kingdom of God, about human moral responsibility, and the like, because it was *primarily* concerned with something else. That something else gave the teaching its importance; it was not the other way round.

Again, the gospel is not a statement of theological propositions. It is indeed inevitable that the Church should develop a theology, a structure of beliefs which are drawn from, and seek to state in as precise language as possible, the gospel and its significance for men. Those who loudly proclaim that they have no theology and that they desire none are all the more likely to have an *implicit* theology—and doubtless it will be a bad one, since it is not consciously held and therefore is not open to continued critical examination. But no theology, whether that of a Barth or of a Brunner, even that of an Augustine or an Aquinas, a Luther or a Calvin, or even that of a Paul, if he can be said to have had "a" theology, can take the place of the gospel itself. The gospel comes before all these theologies and is the basis for their determination as well as the criterion of their validity. This is why I am always a little fearful of what is often described as "doctrinal preaching." All too frequently this turns out to be a substitution for the gospel; it consists of some set of propositions which however traditional and however true they may be, can in fact obscure the basic affirmations of Christian faith and make the gospel itself of none effect for those who hear. A theology we must have, and it should be the best theology that is available for us, carefully constructed and critically understood; but we must not make the mistake of thinking that when we have enunciated and then expounded some theological proposition, be it from the golden middle ages or from Karl Barth, we have thereby communicated the gospel of the living God.

Finally, the gospel is not to be confused with credal and confessional formulations. It was right that the Church should have come to state its basic faith in such terms as we find in the historical creeds; but the faith which the gospel evokes, and the gospel which evokes that faith, cannot be contained in the historical formulations, even while it is stated in them. Here it is necessary, of course, to make a distinction between the later developed creeds—and above all, the various "confessions of faith" of the Reformation period—and the Apostles' Creed. The latter admittedly comes much closer to being a "gospel statement." And behind that creed, we can see that the *primitive* "confessions of faith," to which Professor Cullmann has lately drawn our attention, are the almost immediate result of the proclaiming of the gospel itself. "Jesus is the Lord," "Jesus is the Messiah," "Jesus the Messiah is the Son of God": here we come very close to the gospel, or we already have it stated for us. We can see how the Apostles' Creed is an extension or expansion of such "confessions," made necessary because of movements of thought or opinion which were beginning to invade the Christian community and to threaten the integrity of the gospel the Church preached. We can see, too, how the Nicene Creed, although more theological in nature, is a further amplification to meet further dangers. But even so it remains true that what we might style "credal preaching" is not the same thing as preaching the gospel itself.

If, then, the gospel is not the moral and religious teaching of Jesus, not a theological system, and not the creeds and confessions of the Church, what is it? The answer is really very simple and yet, I believe, very profound. I should claim that the gospel is nothing other than the proclamation of Jesus Christ himself, in the fullness of his historic human life among us, apprehended and declared as the definitive and focal operation of God in the affairs of men. The gospel is nothing other than Jesus Christ our Lord, proclaimed to be "the way, the truth, and the life." It is the announcement that in him very God is manifest in very man, for us men and for our wholeness. It is the declaration that in him God "has visited and redeemed his people." Nothing other than this, nothing less than this, can claim to be the gospel which makes men wise unto salvation.

In our day we have been much enlightened concerning the primitive forms in which this gospel, "the word of God," was proclaimed. Thanks especially to the critical study of Dr. C. Harold Dodd, as summed up in his notable little book, *The Apostolic Preaching*, we have become familiar with the word *kerygma*, Greek for "the proclamation"; and, taught by Dr. Dodd and those who have followed the line of enquiry which he laid down, we have come to see that this *kerygma* was the very heart of the earliest Christianity. This is New Testament Christianity. We have the written "gospels," or accounts of Jesus' sayings and actions, because it was increasingly felt necessary to give a setting for the proclamation. They contain recollections, in faith, of the life of him about whom the proclamation is made, for men remembered what Jesus had said and what he had done because he was the subject of their proclamation. It was the proclamation of him as "Lord and Christ" which gave its uniqueness and its special quality to the primitive Christian community. All this is, or ought to be, common knowledge for the clergy; and increasingly it will be common knowledge for the instructed laity too.

Not quite so frequently do we recognize the variety of ways in which this primitive Christian *kerygma* was expressed by the early Christian preachers. Dr. Dodd has given us a brief summary which is very useful in stating the essential elements in that declaration: how that the God of Israel, who had spoken by the prophets, had acted decisively in Christ, pouring out the gift of the Spirit, and how that this Christ, now exalted, would return in glory for the establishment of God's kingdom. But there are many different ways in which this main declaration found expression, and we have many of these statements of the basic *kerygma* in the New Testament. Sometimes they are very short indeed: "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself"; "while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us"; "God set forth his Son to be the propitiation for our sins"; "God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son"; "the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us." Sometimes, as in many of St. Paul's epistles, they are more fully stated. But in most various phrasing and with very differing emphasis, in the

light of one pattern of thought or another, the same proclamation is being made; and always it comes down to this: that in the Man Jesus, in the totality of his life and action, God has been active, God has been present, in a definitive fashion, to the end that men may have life in him. Each of the various ways of statement is by its very nature a way of apprehending this gospel and then of proclaiming it.

Now it was natural that the first Christian evangelists should proclaim Jesus against the background of Jewish thought and in the context of what they conceived to be God's historical manner of dealing with his people Israel. They knew of this dealing through what we call the Old Testament scriptures and through the continuing Jewish traditions of their time. Hence they used this material in their proclamation. This was inevitable. For our Lord did not come into the world as a kind of *deus ex machina*; "he came unto his own." He appeared as a Jew among Jews; and the Fourth Gospel rightly asserts that "salvation is of the Jews," in the sense that it is only against that background and in that context that the gospel of Christ can be known and understood. In that sense, too, Pope Pius XI was entirely right when he said that "spiritually all Christians are Semites." This is why the earliest preaching was by way of saying that in Jesus all of God's promises made to Israel were fulfilled: he is the "Yea" and the "Amen." This is why the earliest Christians "searched the Scriptures"—the Jewish sacred writings—to find the material which they could use as testifying and witnessing to their Lord and Master. Marcion, with his attempt to de-judaize Jesus, succeeded only in "de-historicizing" him and thereby making him of no real significance; and Tertullian, the great Christian apologist against Marcion, saw this to be the case and stated it clearly and convincingly. You cannot deracinate Jesus, removing him from his given setting in history and among his own people "after the flesh," without at the same time making him a meaningless monstrosity.

And yet, while all this is true and must be emphasized unfailingly in the Church, we cannot, on the other hand, make Jesus simply a figure with Jewish significance and interpret him only in terms of biblical patterns of thought. For when we do this we are equally in danger of reducing his place in the world. In my judgement this is the error of a good many of the exponents of what is nowadays known as "biblical theology." With all their laudable effort to understand the integrity of the Scriptures, both Old and New Testaments, and to insist on the basic unity of the Bible, and with all their recognition of the place of Jesus within the setting of Jewish piety and religious thought, these scholars sometimes fail to see that the very truth about God which the Bible as a whole affirms, and above all that which the New Testament says about Jesus himself, can be smothered by sheer biblicism and thereby made meaningless for those to whom the gospel should be a living, vitalizing, and contemporary message.

In his valuable commentary on *The First Epistle of Peter* (2nd ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 1958, p. 106), Professor F. W. Beare writes: "If the

gospel is to win the hearts of man in any age, it must clothe itself in contemporary forms and bring into its service every thought, imagination, and aspiration of man, that is congenial to its own inner spirit. The glory of Christianity, indeed, lies in this very power to draw enrichment from every source, and to 'become all things to all men.' " That is to say, the Christian gospel, the *kerygma* or proclamation, indeed remains and must remain fixed as the message of the Church, the heart of its life and the meaning of its existence; but at the same time we must find ways in which we can both understand and declare that *kerygma* which will not smother it in an unimaginative biblicism, but which will be appropriate for our own day. We must use all our ingenuity and all our wisdom, all our sympathy and all our wit, to communicate to men and women in our time the central and basic biblical affirmation, without which there would be no Christianity at all and which we believe to be the very word of God for the men and women of our age as of every age.

One of the first steps towards an understanding of the meaning of the gospel is the recognition that the language in which the *kerygma* was initially stated is metaphorical language. I do not mean by this that the gospel is merely a "fairy-tale," although it is of course true that such tales are often told in language of that kind. What I mean is that the words used in the telling, the story itself as told, the ideas that are being conveyed, as well as the setting in which the *kerygma* is to be seen, are not "prose" but are of the nature of poetry and symbol. Here we have imaginative language, evocative in character, not the "literal" language of the chronicle. The gospel which we proclaim is not phrased in the idiom of scientific statement, nor is it told in terms of a philosophical syllogism. It is in fact a *story* and it can be spoken about, and heard, only when this is recognized. Canon T. O. Wedel has said much the same thing in his description of the gospel as a "drama." At the same time as I emphasize this point, however, I wish to insist that this does not imply that the gospel is not grounded in history and established upon events which actually occurred in the world of human experience.

There is an unfortunate impression, found as well among the clergy as among the laity, that to describe the gospel in such metaphorical terms is equivalent to saying that it is not true. One can only remark that it would be a good thing if such persons read a little poetry now and then. Evidently they suffer from the delusion that whatever is not put in prose must necessarily be a lie. But the truth is that in the great matters of life, we men have no choice: we *must* speak as poets. The heart always speaks imaginatively, poetically; and the truth that is to go to the heart must be phrased in this mode. Furthermore, precisely because the gospel has to do with historical event, and because it understands that event in the light of faith in the unseen divine reality whom we call God, there is no other language available for us. To talk of history is to talk imaginatively; otherwise we are not talking about history at all, but about "chronicle" or "annal," which is a

very different thing. In German we can distinguish between *Historie*, or sheer chronicling, and *Geschichte*, or event apprehended in its deep significance; in English, alas, this verbal distinction cannot be made. But the fact remains a fact nonetheless. Significant history is always told in the imaginative idiom of poetry. And when to that plain fact we add the specifically Christian interpretation of our Lord's life, death, and rising-again, in which God is seen as involved in a supreme manner in occurrences in the public domain of history, it is all the more necessary to use imaginative language, metaphor, poetry, symbol. For we *cannot* speak literally about God and his ways, as if we had a precise chart for the purpose of mapping the divine activity; there is always likeness in difference. When St. Thomas Aquinas says, in the *Summa Theologiae* (Part III, Qu. 8, Art. 1), that the phrase "Christ is the Head of the Church" is metaphorical, he goes on to make this important point: "In metaphorical speech we must not expect a likeness in all respects; for thus there would be not likeness but identity." In that statement he gives us a clue to the nature of theological language, and *a fortiori* to the language appropriate to the gospel: it is not precise *identity*, but *likeness*, that is in view; and this, as he notes, means that we speak in metaphor. Religious language is poetical. But the fact that the language is metaphorical, or if you will poetical, does not mean that it is untrue. It does not imply that the events of which the gospel speaks did not happen.

It was of course the historicity of Jesus Christ which provided a major reason for the victory of Christian faith in the Graeco-Roman world. But we must now go on to notice that such historicity need not mean that we have a complete and carefully detailed record of our Lord's days in Palestine. We do not possess any such record. What we do have is a series of reminiscences, collected and handed on "from faith to faith." We have impressions of the impact of Jesus on those who knew him best. Our "early traditions about Jesus" (to use the title of a little book by the late Professor Bethune-Baker) are not interested so much in what has been called the "biographical Jesus" as they are concerned with what Jesus did and said as he was remembered by those who believed him to be their Lord, the Risen Messiah, and who were therefore anxious to hand on to others what was remembered about him.

Some scholars indeed have thought that, because this is the case, we can have no genuine knowledge of the Jesus of history. Such scholars may be on the extreme radical wing or they may be extreme conservatives. The former would tend to minimize the centrality of the historical Jesus in the religion named after him and would turn Christianity into a *mere* symbol. The latter would stress the Christ of faith—perhaps the Christ of the Church's faith—and would feel that the historical life matters little in comparison to the salvation wrought out in the believer's faith. I believe that we know the Jesus of history very well, even if we do not have a precise and photographic account of his day-by-day activities; and I am convinced that the

unique claim of Christianity is that, in and by those events in the actual realm of historical happenedness, God is revealed—revealed, of course, in and under the conditions of history and human life, but revealed nonetheless. There is no Christ of faith who is not continuous with the Jesus who walked this earth in the first century of our era. *Jesus* is seen by faith to be the Christ; but the *Christ* is one and the same person as the Jesus of history.

Having said this, however, we must see what ought in any event to have been obvious: that the several gospels are collections of brief tales, remembered incidents, bits of sayings, and the like, all gathered together in the interest of giving what St. Mark's opening words so well describe: "the beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ the Son of God"—the account of the historical happenings, as the Christian community remembered them, which gave rise to the faith that Jesus is the promised Messiah and the divine Lord. The "account of the historical happenings" is not like a newspaper reporter's story of some public meeting or some incident that he has been sent to "cover." The account is inevitably "conditioned" by faith; it is seen in faith; it is communicated along with faith. It has its setting in what the German form-critics have called the *Sitz-im-Leben,* the "life-situation," of the primitive Christian Church. But it has its setting also, as Professor Paul Minear has lately insisted, in the "faith-situation" and in the "worship-situation" of the Christian community, if these barbarous terms may be allowed. Not only did the exigencies of the life of the first Christians, with the problems they had to face, occasion the handing-on of the tales and the teaching, and to a large degree determine how the tales and the teaching were to be communicated. The demands of faith in Jesus, which as it developed came to penetrate ever more deeply into the meaning of his person and work, and the requirements of the worship of God known in faith as working in Jesus the Lord, a worship which likewise was developing in those early days, had their part both in the telling of the stories and in the way the stories were told.

But what importance has all this for the preaching of the gospel? I should answer that such an understanding of the way in which the compilation of the gospel narratives took place, and also of the nature of the material which they contain, delivers us in our preaching of the *kerygma* from much that was troublesome and confusing to an earlier generation. For it enables us to stress the historicity of the evangelical message; and equally to stress the fact that our recognition of the metaphorical language in which it is couched, as well as our knowledge of how the setting of that message in the life of Christ took shape, does not in any way reduce this historicity. What it does do is help us to have a better appreciation of the *kind* of historical material which gives us the gospel, and thus it assists us towards an approach to the preaching of the gospel which is of extraordinary value in our own day.

I have been speaking of the need for finding a way of stating the *kerygma* which will be relevant to our own time, while it will also be true to the

abiding affirmation of faith which gives the Church its essential being. This leads me to emphasize the necessity laid upon us for translation. In our preaching of the gospel we must get at it, present its "offense," in such a fashion that it is a challenge to decision for men and women who live in the middle half of the twentieth century. But the idiom of the Bible, in which the gospel is phrased for us, seems unintelligible to many such persons. It is not merely that they cannot understand what we say; it is that they cannot understand what we are talking about. Hence we *must* translate; we must be ready to say, "in other words . . ."

Now some seem to think that all translation is traduction; they would appear to assume that to translate is inevitably to betray the original. Of course this may be so. If we are not sufficiently instructed in the original, if we do not have an ear open to nuances, if we are literal-minded and prosaic, we shall doubtless be guilty of traduction. But on the other hand, the refusal to translate at all is likely to make us sound as if we were parrots repeating a merely verbal form to those who somehow or other can be brought to listen to such boring stuff. Of course the fact is that translation need not necessarily be betrayal at all; it can be faithful translation. Translation, if it is to be good, involves two factors: first, that we shall know the language *from* which we translate; and second, that we shall know the language *into* which we translate. In the period now so easily dismissed as "the age of liberalism," it was doubtless true that some who engaged in translation did not know, deeply and thoroughly, the language *from* which they were to translate; hence they sometimes preached a gospel which was another gospel from that which "makes" the Church. But in the present time, it seems to me, altogether too many of us may know or think we know the original quite well, but we do not know the language *into* which we are to translate; hence the gospel as preached is preached to ears that do not and cannot hear, because they are ears that are attuned to a quite different set of conditions, patterns of thought, and ways of conceiving the universe.

This business of translation is unquestionably an exacting task. Probably one reason for the emergence of the strictly "biblical" type of preaching in our own day is that many have felt that the efforts of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to translate had only succeeded in betraying. In some instances, as I have admitted, this may have been the case. But the modern cure seems often to be worse than the old disease. For what is nowadays preached by those who follow the new and fashionable school is frequently simply unintelligible, meaningless, without significance, to a very considerable proportion of their hearers, both those who are within the Church itself and even more those who are outside the "blessed company of faithful people."

For myself, I freely admit that I belong to that small group of Christian theologians who would maintain the necessity for a "new Christian modernism." By this I am not suggesting anything very startling, for all

Christian thinkers have been engaged in one way or another in the "reconception" of the faith of the Church. I am thinking particularly of men in recent years like William Sanday and James Franklin Bethune-Baker and William Porcher DuBose, to name only Anglicans—and there were many others in other Christian bodies. These men were not "reductionists," in the sense that they were seeking to lower the claims of the gospel. Neither were they "minimizers," in the sense that they were willing to make the Christian faith an easy and simple thing which would appeal to any "man of good will." Rather they were intent on taking the essential core of Christianity, which is the gospel of the living God, the proclamation of God's presence and work in Christ for men's wholeness, and on so thinking it through again, so "re-conceiving" its implications, so teaching it and so preaching it, that people living in their own time could *hear* it and, if they were willing to make the commitment and surrender, accept it for themselves.

In the past few decades we have had a great theological revival. Some of its contributions have been of enormous value to us all but many of them seem to me to be both dangerous and unfortunate. For the overall result of the great reaction has been, in my judgement, a sophistication of the true simplicity of the gospel, the use of a jargon which the common man (and the intelligent one, too, often enough) cannot understand, and a tendency to assume that the biblical and credal language *as its stands* need only be spoken, and enough has then been done to state and communicate the point of the Christian proclamation. Yet the early Church itself, when it departed from biblical idiom at the Council of Nicaea and used for theological purposes a non-biblical word, *homoousios,* as the guarantor of the biblical meaning, gave Christians in later days a charter for translation—provided always that it is the gospel, its setting and its significance, that we are translating, and not some bright and novel ideas of our own.

Surely I need not labour the point. No preacher with any sensitivity can do other than agree that he does not easily "get the message across." Nor would he claim, if he is honest with himself and about those to whom he speaks, that it is the sinfulness of his hearers, and that alone, which gets in his way. He would say that to a considerable degree it is just that he is not understood. And he would admit that he is not understood because he is talking in patterns which have little or no point of contact with those who listen. His statement of the gospel is couched too often in language and in a context which bear little or no relationship to the circumstances, the accepted ways of thinking of the world both scientifically and philosophically, in which the hearers live.

We must recognize, too, that not all of these circumstances, these accepted ways of thinking, are wicked and wrong. That would be an easy way out of our problems. We could simply denounce the evil world and leave it there. But God has been speaking in secular ways to men and women through the

ages; he has led them into more of the truth about the structure and functioning of the world in which they live; he is at work in the areas of human study, exploration, research, and enquiry, which have given us this "new" world. Doubtless much of what is believed and taught about it is wrong or partially wrong. But in any event this is *where the people live*. This is their *condition*. It is in these terms that they will be reached or they will not be reached at all.

So we need a new kind of approach in our preaching of the gospel; and this approach depends upon a new way of envisaging the gospel itself. On the one hand we dare not attempt to minimize or reduce the historic faith as this centres in the Church's age-old evangel. But on the other hand, we must be willing to take the risk of finding for the gospel new ways of expression which will speak directly and vividly to the hearts of men in this age. One of the corollaries of this attitude and approach will be theological in nature; we shall recognize that there are things central and indispensable, things peripheral and secondary. In fact we shall come to see, as Erasmus once remarked, *quae pertinent ad fidem paucissimis articulis absoluantur*: that the things which pertain to the faith are to be phrased in as few articles as possible.

What is needed is to see that we dare not seek a "new thing," but we must seek to understand and preach the old gospel in a "new way"—some of my readers will notice that I am paraphrasing Vincent of Lerins' great phrase, *non nova sed nove*. The gospel which we preach is the Church's gospel and we preach it in the context of the life of the Church. The gospel is the very meaning of the Church's existence; it *is* the Church's existence. It—or rather, he who is its heart—is the *raison d'être* of "the Holy Church throughout all the world." If the Church did not have this gospel, it would be simply a more or less interesting sociological phenomenon. Because it has this gospel, it is the community of faith in which men respond to him whom the gospel proclaims: Jesus Christ the Lord as God's definitive and focal action for man's wholeness. But the converse is also true. The gospel without the Church would be the gospel without a setting and therefore a barren and sterile thing. Preachers of the gospel would be voices "crying in the wilderness." But the gospel in the Church *can* be stale and meaningless; my contention is that this need not be so, if we who are preachers know our duty today.

This is not the place, nor would space permit me, to develop in detail some of the suggestions which might be made concerning the preaching of "the old gospel in a new way." Perhaps in a later paper this could be done. All I have sought to say in the present essay is that the task is urgent; that we should all concern ourselves with it; and that self-examination along these lines will be more likely to give our preaching of the gospel of Christ a contemporary relevance because it will make us more aware of the basic problem, than will the easy and popular placing of all blame upon the supposed "materialism," "secularism," or "humanism" of our people.

Psalm 118: An Exposition

S. B. FROST

THE CITY of Montreal encircles the mountain from which it takes its name. Some of the taller buildinngs built against the mountain side have the pleasant architectural feature of possessing several front doors, placed on different sides of the building, and at different levels. Entrance may be gained from several roads giving access at various floors to the whole building.

So it is with the Psalter. We may enter into the structure of a psalm at any one of at least three levels of understanding. The basic level is that of seeking to determine the meaning of the psalm for the man who wrote it. Most literary productions in the ancient world had their origin in some particular "setting in life"—love songs were composed for wedding-feasts, dirges for funerals, laments for fasts, hymns for cultic occasions. It is important to grasp Gunkel's point that "free" literary composition was not natural to the ancient world, and that the differing types of literary production arose out of particular human situations. Thus the basic level of understanding with regard to any psalm is to ask: For what purpose did its author compose it? Out of what setting in life did it come? What did the author understand himself to be saying to his contemporaries in that particular social situation? These are the basic exegetical questions.

When, however, we have recognized and reconstructed the "setting in life" and thus are reasonably sure that we have grasped the meaning of the psalm for the author and his friends, we are but ready to move to a second level of understanding. As the generations handed down a poem from one to another, it often acquired a new meaning and significance, quite distinct from the author's original intention. I have previously in this journal drawn attention to such a change with regard to Ps. 45.[1] It began as an epithalamium for a king's wedding, the king in question being most probably Ahab and the bride Jezebel. It was, however, intrinsically a good song and one that could be used, with a little poetic licence, at many other marriages both royal and common. It thus acquired the canonicity of popular approval, but nevertheless it also received in time the decent dress of a religious significance. The explanation became current that the bridegroom of the song was the Messiah and his bride the New Jerusalem. It is important for us to recognize that it was with this secondary meaning that the psalm found a place in the religious anthology we call the Psalter. Had

1. Cf. S. B. Frost, "The Christian Interpretation of the Psalms," *CJT*, 5 (1959), 25–34.

it not acquired this second interpretation it might have found its way into that other anthology which we know as "The Song of Songs," but probably not into the Psalter. In the case of this psalm, then we enter biblically into the structure of the psalm at the second floor, and have to make our way down from there, if we so desire, to the *rez-de-chaussée.* This is true of all the so-called "messianic" psalms. They originally had their "setting in life" in some particular royal event or ceremony, but with the passing of the kingship, they were eschatologized and became "messianic" in the modern sense of the term, and only thus were accepted into the Psalter. This second level of understanding is what we might call "the setting in scripture." The questions by which it is reached are: Why did this composition survive? What did the psalm mean to the people who transmitted it from generation to generation? What did it signify to those who gathered it into this particular anthology of poetical pieces? This last question clearly involves our having reached an assurance that we have rightly grasped the significance of the Psalter as a whole, and that assurance is by no means easily come by. Is it, as Pfeiffer maintained, the "manifesto of the 'Pious' "[2], first and foremost a laymen's collection, brought together for use in private meditation and in unofficial conventicles, or is it, to use the popular term, "the hymn book of the Temple"?[3] We shall have to come back to this point later.

There is one further level of understanding which we must most certainly explore when we seek to expound the "Word of God." When he produced his *Readings in St. John Gospel,* William Temple wrote in the Introduction:

> It is an attempt to share with any who read it what I find to be my own thoughts as I read the profoundest of all writings. Consequently it is not chiefly concerned with the question what the writer consciously intended, though of course that question frequently arises; nor again with the question how much of what is here set down has its origin in the deeds and words of the Lord Jesus when on earth, though of that something is said later in this Introduction. I am chiefly concerned with what arises in my mind and spirit as I read; and I hope this is not totally different from saying that I am concerned with what the Holy Spirit says to me through the Gospel.[4]

The Bible has in fact lived through twenty centuries largely by the readiness of the Spirit to speak through the written Word to the hearts and consciences of ordinary men and women. But not seldom their best and finest thoughts have depended on a misunderstanding of the text. This may range all the way from the pious woman who found such comfort in the word "Mesopotamia"—she did not know what it meant but she was sure

2. R. H. Pfeiffer, *Introduction to the Old Testament*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper, 1952), p. 620.

3. Cf. E. A. Leslie, *The Psalms* (Nashville-New York, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1949), p. 18: "Sigmund Mowinckel's brilliant and extraordinarily suggestive studies in the psalms have made it appear most likely that practically every psalm in the Psalter was intended for rendition in the regular and officially constituted worship of the Temple and is rightly understood as part of that worship."

4. William Temple, *Readings in St. John's Gospel*, First Series: Chapters I–XII (London: Macmillan, 1939), p. ix.

it was full of the mysterious wisdom of God—to the many who are misguided by the English translation of the twenty-third psalm to suppose, very reasonably, that "he leads me in paths of righteousness in order that the divine reputation should not suffer."

However much such misunderstandings will distress the biblical scholar and set him making new translations and writings further commentaries, the parish minister will not be able to deplore them to the same extent. He knows that the thoughts which arise in his people's hearts as they read their daily portion of scripture are very precious to them, and indeed are the very stuff of religion. Discount these and the life has gone from all forms of Christianity based on the primacy of scripture as a means of grace. Nevertheless the parish minister is also keenly aware of the strange aberrations into which men can stray unless he, as pastor and teacher, can instruct them in the true meaning of scripture, and his theological education will have made very clear to him the need for this third level of understanding to be based firmly and solidly on a sound knowledge of the lower levels. Exposition stands on exegesis—that is, it is only when a careful exegesis has given us the freedom of the lower floors that we can with any assurance mount up to that exposition which is the uppermost and indeed the creative level of understanding. And yet our opening illustration holds true, since many if not all of us first enter the House of the Interpreter at the top floor. We have to learn somewhat painfully how to make our way downstairs. However, it is certainly true that if anyone seeks to be "a workman who has no need to be ashamed, rightly handling the Word of truth," he must have a thorough knowledge of those lower floors by which the upper levels are sustained and conditioned. Exposition does indeed stand on exegesis.

I

The opening verses of our psalm (vv. 1–4) together with the closing verse (v. 29) are clearly additions made at some time when the composition of an individual was taken over and adapted for some other use. Our search for a setting in life must therefore be concerned with the original production, vv. 5–28. It is in fact a royal thanksgiving. A Judean King—commentators have inevitably suggested Hezekiah—has been gravely beset by overwhelming enemies. It appeared that he had no hope of victory over them, and that the virtue of success had departed from him. In this situation he cried to Yahweh:

> Out of my distress I called on the LORD;
> the LORD answered me and set me free.
>
> With the LORD on my side I do not fear.
> What can man do to me?
>
> The LORD is on my side to help me;
> I shall look in triumph on those who hate me.

It is better to take refuge in the LORD
than to put confidence in man.

It is better to take refuge in the LORD
than to put confidence in princes.

Having received an assurance that "Yahweh was on his side," he and his men were able to face their foes with such valour that they destroyed the enemy's confidence and asserted their own. It was touch and go at one point, but so strong was the sense of victory within him that the king finally triumphed over all the opposition:

All nations surrounded me;
in the name of the LORD I cut them off!

They surrounded me; surrounded me on every side;
in the name of the LORD I cut them off!

They surrounded me like bees,
they blazed like a fire of thorns;
in the name of the LORD I cut them off!

I was pushed hard, so that I was falling,
but the LORD helped me.

The LORD is my strength and my song;
he has become my salvation.

He recalls how the night after battle the Judean camp was filled with song and victory-joy. His men were united in ascribing their victory to direct divine intervention. For himself, there was the surpassing happiness of an incredible reprieve. He repeated it to himself in wonderment: "I am not dead, but alive! I am not going to die, but to live! I shall live to tell the story of Yahweh's personal concern for me. He chastised me sorely, but it was only to discipline and to teach, and I shall live to talk of his goodness!"

Hark, glad songs of victory in the tents of the righteous:
"The right hand of the LORD does valiantly,

the right hand of the LORD is exalted,
the right hand of the LORD does valiantly!"

I shall not die, but I shall live,
and recount the deeds of the LORD.

The LORD has chastened me sorely,
but he has not given me over to death.

This thanksgiving was not in the nature of a poem composed, as a modern might do it, in a quiet room and then distributed in fair copy to a few chosen friends. Rather, the ancient "setting in life" is that of a public thanksgiving by the king in the Temple. He has been standing so far in the outer precincts at the entrance to the inner court, and has been reciting his testimony on this proud and joyous occasion to a great multitude—the officers and men of his army, the state officials, the aristocracy, and all the people of Jerusalem. Having testified to all present that the virtue of success

is upon him and that the blessing of God is evident in his experience, he now turns to address the priests waiting in the inner court. Let them open the barrier that he may enter and offer a thanksgiving sacrifice:

> Open to me the gates of righteousness,
> that I may enter through them
> and give thanks to the LORD.

But they are the custodians of Yahweh's house and they must be assured of the good standing of any whom they allow to draw near to his altar. It is only the righteous who may enter, and the righteous are known by that aura of prosperity and well-being which surrounds those whom Yahweh has blessed:

> This is the gate of the LORD;
> the righteous shall enter through it.

To this the king replies with a strong assertion of his own well-being and of his own consciousness that the virtue of success is upon him. The assertion takes the form of a thanksgiving, which is an idiomatic formula of very strong asseveration.[5] It is coupled with a well-known proverb, which reflects a common experience during dry-walling or of building with undressed stone—the awkward, useless piece, often picked up and as often dropped again, turns out at the end to be just the piece for "topping off." So the king, who appeared to be a rejected and fallen man, is now seen to be the one for whom Yahweh has a particular care and affection:

> I thank thee that thou hast answered me
> and hast become my salvation.
>
> The stone which the builders rejected
> has become the chief corner-stone.

To this royal assertion of divine approval the priests reply with the ready acknowledgement that they can see Yahweh's hand in these remarkable events, and that this day is a momentous occasion for which Yahweh alone is responsible. They therefore call on all men to recognize his power and worship him with joy and humble dependence:

> This is the LORD'S doing;
> it is marvelous in our eyes.
>
> This is the day which the LORD has made;
> let us rejoice and be glad in it.
>
> Save us, we beseech thee, O LORD!
> O LORD, we beseech thee, give us success!

They then turn to the king and by virtue of their priestly authority they call down upon him afresh on this joyful day the blessing of Yahweh:

> Blessed be he who enters in the name of the LORD!
> We bless you from the house of the LORD.
> The LORD is God, and he has given us light.

5. Cf. S. B. Frost, "Asseveration by Thanksgiving," *Vetus Testamentum*, 8 (1958), 380f.

The second half of v. 27 seems simply to be a stage-direction or rubric which has wandered into the text, but in the remaining verse we have the king's heartfelt acceptance of the blessing and his renewed expression of humble dependence on God. Presumably it was at this point that the king and his retinue entered the inner court and offered sacrifice, making visible and concrete their sense of gratitude and thanksgiving.

> Thou art my God, and I will give thanks to thee;*
> thou art my God, I will extol thee.

II

This then was the original "setting in life," but why should the thanksgiving produced on such an occasion happen to live, and why should it become part of the common heritage of the Hebrew people? To answer this question we must attempt to enter upon the second level of interpretation, and to do this we must first revert to the question of the nature of the Psalter as a whole. Is it the "manifesto of the 'Pious' " or is it "the hymn-book of the temple"?

It is important to recognize that "the Temple" is an ambiguous phrase. When Jesus taught "in the Temple," or the New Testament church was daily "in the Temple" or Hananiah accosted Jeremiah "in the house of the LORD," the reference is not to the separated inner court where the altar of burnt-offering stood, and in which the priestly rituals were magnificently conducted. Rather, the reference is to the outer courts,[6] where the Temple money-changers sat and where the pigeon and lamb sellers had their stalls, and where little groups of like-minded men could gather in a *sodh* or circle, for spiritual conversation, for fellowship and for teaching the young. As Gunkel rightly insisted, the core of the Psalter is the "Laments of the Individual," and their "setting in life" is that of the conversation-group or *sodh*. It is essentially a layman's group or conventicle of the pious. In the inner court, on the other hand, the liturgy of the great Temple occasions was enacted, and the daily seasonal sacrifices of Israel were offered on the great altar. Here the events of national significance and the high moments of the king's reign gave rise to compositions which persisted in the Temple treasury of devotion long after the original occasion and even the royal line itself had passed away. Here also the "occasional" sacrifices of the private individual, the sacrifices of thanksgiving or vow-fulfilment or penitence, were accompanied by prayers and hymns which tended to be used on successive similar occasions and so were in some instances preserved for the great anthology of Israel's devotion.

Thus when we say the Temple was a locale of the "setting in life" of much if not all of the Psalter, we need to recall this ambivalence of the term "Temple." It embraced both the cultus and the conventicle within its scope. Moreover, there was no doubt a good deal of traffic

6. Cf. "Solomon's Portico" (Acts 3:11; 5:12).

between the two aspects of Temple religion—the liturgical composition from the inner court was borrowed for recitation and discussion by the *sodh* and the individual lament found its way into the levitical choirs' repertoire.

Our psalm then is itself the product of the inner court. It was the thanksgiving of the king for victory in battle and for his vindication in the eyes of his people. But when the kingship departed it was taken over for use with a wider reference and adapted to congregational use. The "I" of the psalm now became not the king but the nation. It was used to express the perennial sense of the people of God that "Zion with Babylon must cope," and she survives in her warfare only by the sheer grace of God, and that as constantly renewed. In order to make this new application of the psalm evident, the liturgical versicles and responses were added at the beginning and end of the psalm;

> O give thanks to the LORD, for he is good;
> his steadfast love endures for ever!
>
> Let Israel say,
> "His steadfast love endures for ever."
>
> Let the House of Aaron say,
> "His steadfast love endures for ever."
>
> Let those who fear the LORD say,
> "His steadfast love endures for ever." . . .
>
> O give thanks to the LORD, for he is good;
> for his steadfast love endures for ever!

Probably, however, the adoption of the psalm and its adaptation for national as distinct from royal worship were not the only reason for its survival and inclusion in the Psalter.[7] It seems clear from the Hebrew psalm-titles and the identification of many psalms with particular events in the life of David (and this in the post-exilic period when messianic interest was noticeably lacking in the priesthood) that the final selection and editing of the psalter was the work of the laymen of the *sodh*. In this sense, Pfeiffer is right with his tag the "manifesto of the 'Pious'." With such a psalm as this, characterized as it is by an intensely personal conviction of God's care for the individual, we may be quite sure that it was taken over for use in the conventicle for those occasions when a member wanted to praise God for vindication. He had perhaps been under suspicion of leprosy; some his acquaintances were already concluding that he was thus pre-eminently a sinner; his own horror was beginning to rise up and choke him—but the skin eruption cleared up, he was not a leper, he was not branded a sinner in the eyes of all men, he was not going to die a horrible living death, but to live in the full sense of the word! Here then was a psalm of vindication which pretty well suited the occasion and when he returned to the *sodh*, his recitation of that psalm that day thanked God,

7. Cf. Pss. 51, 52, 54.

rebuked his critics and announced his vindication, all in unmistakable and triumphant terms. A psalm which could so speak for the inner heart of a man was not one that could be allowed to die. It must be preserved and given an honoured place in the anthology of devotion. True, it was originally the psalm of a king, but the democratization of religion is a steady factor in the life of the ancient east.

Here, then, is the second level of interpretation of the psalm. It is the level at which it became the expression, for the congregation and for the individual alike, of those powerful feelings of spiritual release when, after a season of pressure and threat and condemnation, the moment of salvation and vindication comes gloriously upon us.

III

The third level of interpretation is the one in which we have the greatest freedom. Some even of those who are acquainted with the rest of the structure choose to remain on this upper level more or less permanently and seldom descend to the lower floors. The views are so distant, the light so pervasive, the rooms themselves so unconfined and so constantly refreshed by the visiting winds of the Spirit. It is, however, just because those winds tend to blow wildly, and just because the sense of freedom and light is inebriating, that sometimes the perspective of our viewing proves deceptive and our sense of relative values becomes confused. It is then that a return to look out upon God's truth from a lower level can be so sobering and restorative. But if, despite the subjective character and the personal nature of any such description, the present writer were to be asked to describe what he sees of God's truth from this vantage point, he would reply at this present time as follows.

Remembering that the psalm is originally a king's psalm, we cannot ignore its messianic character. The royal psalms were messianized by the Jews, and Jesus read and taught this psalm as applying to himself. He was, he said, the stone which the builders had rejected, which was now to become the head of the corner;[8] it was by his permission, if not at his invitation, that the crowds greeted him on Palm Sunday, with the quotation of the verse: "Hosanna, Blessed is he who comes in the name of the Lord."[9] It is therefore a messianic psalm, and the messianic psalms speak of Jesus. As the Christian reads this psalm, or sings it in church, the theme of vindication which runs so steadily through it is for him the theme of the vindication of Jesus. The Palm Sunday recognition and acceptance was proleptic of that other recognition, when, his task accomplished, Jesus should rise from the experience of shame and suffering and death, to be recognized by God and man as Lord of life and King of Kings. The Christian understanding of Scripture is that this psalm was used at the one event in order that it might point more clearly to the other.

8. Matt. 21:42.
9. Matt. 21:9; cf. Ps. 118:25f. (Hebrew).

Here all the questions of mythology pour in upon us. What reality in Jesus does this parable of kingship point us to? This cultic, almost forensic term, "vindication," what is it really saying about him? My own understanding is as follows. The birth, maturation, ministry, passion and death of Jesus of Nazareth, if he was truly the Son of God, are eloquent of all those values which we term Christian. It is in his self-denial, humility, and out-going love that we see and comprehend the nature of those values, and become inspired to express them in our own lives. But when we practise humility and self-denial and seek to express a love for our fellows, we are told we are fools, idealists, visionaries. Life, we are warned, is not like that. Life is a struggle for existence, and its prizes are for the self-assertive and the self-regarding. We reply: No, it is you who are wrong. It is you who have the perverted view of reality. Jesus came from God, and lived this life and died this death, because these values are God's values, and he is expressing God's humility, God's self-denial, God's all-embracing love. The Christian values are not visionary dreams, but have metaphysical reality in this universe, because this is God's universe, and this is the way he has made it. To live in this universe, careless of and contrary to these values, is to invite disaster and to call down nemesis upon yourself; whereas to live in reverence of them and to seek to express them in daily choices leads to personal maturity and well-being. So we assert, and so the world denies; and we can only cling to our faith and wait. We wait until such time as the spiritual values inherent in the birth and life and death of Jesus are made evident to all men, so that all must acknowledge, to their joy or to their utter confusion, that these things are so. How God will do this, in what sense the myth of the Second Coming will be translated into reality, we do not know. But every eye shall see him, and the knave shall no longer be called noble, and the metaphysical realities shall be revealed, and the Christian values shall be asserted, and Jesus shall be vindicated. It is of this that the psalm speaks in its messianic significance.

But the psalm is not only messianic. It was taken into the cultic worship of the Temple, and the "I" of the psalm became the corporate personality of Israel. Just as the royal figure of the Old Testament points forward to Jesus, so the Israel of the Old Testament points forward to the Church. Here then the psalm speaks of the vindication of the Church. Straightway I am sorely tempted to seize this opportunity to defend that much maligned mother of us all—and that, not as *ecclesia invisibilis* or as *ecclesia triumphans* but simply as the empirical twentieth-century institution at which all men are so ready to poke fun. For I love the Church, the Church I know, the Church which holds faith-teas, and runs jumble-sales for charities, and gives with amazing, constant generosity of time and money which no other corporate body on earth can begin to parallel; the Church which stumbles about on Sunday in liturgies far too big for it, and shamefully abuses its sacraments because it does not grasp their meaning; the Church which is woefully ignorant of its own faith and is time and time again its own worst

advocate; which is ignored, ridiculed and despised by the self-styled intelligentsia, and yet often more cruelly hurt from within by shallow would-be reformers who say things calculated to wound because they have been taken in by the phrase "shock-therapy"; but nevertheless the Church which continues, the Church which has survived the greatest social upheavals in human history, the veritable ship of salvation, riding a little water-logged over the tempestuous seas of intellectual revolution, battered but still afloat and *gaily* so. Who so knowing the Church could not but love it, and rush to its defence at the first opportunity? But this is a temptation to be resisted, for the vindication of which we are to speak is not of that kind.

In the psalm, the Church in the character of Israel presents itself at the entrance at the inner court of the Temple and cries, "Open to me the gates of righteousness that I may go in and worship the Lord," but the custodians reply that these are indeed the gates of righteousness, and therefore only the righteous may enter. Has the Church that righteousness which alone can permit her to enter? Without holiness no man may see the Lord! To this she replies in asseverative thanksgiving that the evident signs of God's blessing are upon her. She has been met by his goodness and mercy, *tobh wāhesedh*, and these only are her communion-tokens of entrance. Her warfare has been stern and her enemies many, but she has by God's help overcome them all. Her victory is the sign of her acceptance with God. Therefore she may enter and worship.

Jesus said, "Be of good cheer, I have overcome the world." The one true vindication of the Church is in its ability to overcome the world. It must take social change, intellectual revolution, scientific discoveries and atom bombs in its stride. The Church must live in Nazi Germany, in Soviet Russia, in Communist China, in affluent Western Society, unsubdued, uncorrupted and unashamed. It may at times falter and become identified with its social milieu, as in medieval Europe or in pre-revolution Russia, and as it is even now in grave danger of becoming in North America today, but it is only its true self and only vindicated by God when it stands apart from the world, over against the world and overcoming the world. And the Church overcomes the world when it refuses to conform in its thinking and practice to the ethos of the society in which it finds itself and when it accepts its scale of values not from society but from Jesus of Nazareth as the incarnate Son of God, in whose birth, life and death the humility, self-denial and outgoing love of God is made apparent to her. Whenever the Church so lives, whether in prosperity or persecution, in strength or in weakness, the fact that she is overcoming the world sets the seal of divine approval upon her, and she is vindicated. This is the Church which not only on Sunday but on every day may begin its worship with words of continual significance: "This is the day which the Lord hath made. Let us rejoice and be glad in it." For *these* days, these days of her living in the world and overcoming the world, these are the days of her salvation and every one of them is marvellous in her eyes.

In the outer courts of the Temple, our psalm passed into the hands of those who identified the "I" of its testimony with the "I" of their own religious experience. In its delineation of danger and deliverance they found mirrored their own experience of peril and salvation. So, too, as we read the psalm today we find here one of the classic biblical accounts of the plain man's experience of salvation. For one reader, at least, it unfolds itself after this manner.

The enemies of the religious man are legion. One of the many compensations which those of us who live in the twentieth-century West receive from our present situation, is that these enemies are not so easily confused with a number of deceptive decoys. In the earlier age it was possible for a man to think that his foes were men of another nation with whom his own was at war; or that they were men of another faith; or even that they were other Christians who were persecuting the group to which he himself belonged. In some lands it is today still possible to be misled—indeed, it is the rare and noble Christian who can readily distinguish between persecutors and the true enemy of his soul. But here in the West, where we have no personal adversaries or opponents, the enemies of the soul cannot shelter behind such decoys, nor use them as scapegoats. Nor again is the modern Christian likely to be grievously misled when the forces of evil within and without are brought together and personalized as the Devil; certainly he is not to be deceived into thinking that some elements in his behaviour-patterns can be capitalized and reified as Fear or Greed or Pride, and that these are the enemies with whom he must contend. What gives the lie to all these camouflages is that when the Christian presents himself at the inner shrine asking to be admitted into the Presence, his right of entry is that he has battled and overcome his enemy. This, however, means that he is victorious, *he* has been brave and strong, *he* is praiseworthy, *he* is to be commended, and therefore he comes proudly, asking for the entry into the inner shrine as of right. Yet no Christian ever feels that he can come before God in such a vain-glorious mood. Here, then, is a paradox—he comes as victor, and by reason of conquest he asks for admittance, and yet he comes humbly, broken and dependent. The paradox is resolved only when the enemy over whom he triumphed is seen to be himself. The temptation to externalize, to personify, to identify the enemy without, is always present, but the real enemy is the enemy within, the self. When self has been conquered we can come humbly, broken, defeated and victorious, and in thankful penitence we ask, not of right, but of God's grace, that we may enter the kingdom. For in the conquest of self, our dependence on the Holy Spirit is such that we sing the song of victory which was heard in the tents of the victorious king:

> The right hand of the LORD does valiantly,
> the right hand of the LORD is exalted,
> the right hand of the LORD does valiantly.

Before whom then is man vindicated? Not before men; this would be to

reintroduce the element of vain-glory. Nor before God; the falsity of the forensic metaphor lay just there, that it transformed the Father into the Judge before whom man must be vindicated as innocent. But man is not innocent, and God is not Judge, but Father, a father who knows his sons as they are and loves them for what they are, and for what they may become. Man has no need to be vindicated before God. His need is to be vindicated before himself. Since his enemy is himself it is in the sight of himself that he must be vindicated. He is his own enemy in that his sense of failure, his helpless frustration, his awareness of his isolated individuality and his knowledge of his own mortality, all combine to hold him in the grip of *Angst*, the ultimate and basic despair. By the conquest of his self-hood, his desire no longer to assert his own worth and value, he is brought to acknowledge and to love himself. He no longer condemns himself, but accepts himself for what he is—sinful, impotent and mortal. Such he always will be apart from divine grace: his salvation can never be his own accomplishment, and therefore the responsibility for it is his no longer. Here is the ground of Christian hope. Surrendered to divine grace, he can now accept himself, he can now live with himself, he is vindicated, not with pride but by the very loss of it, in his own eyes. For one reader, this psalm says: "Who is my enemy? It is myself. Who is my judge? It is myself. Who is my saviour? It is the Lord!" It is because of this that he can say in wondering amazement:

> I shall not die but I shall live,
> and recount the deeds of the LORD.

VI

The structure of the psalm stands tall and lofty on the hillside of God's truth, and we may enter upon it at many levels. But it is those who have gained the freedom of the lower floors who may mount most surely to the uppermost story. There like the prophet Habakkuk they take their stand to watch, and station themselves on the tower, and look forth to see what the Holy Spirit will say to them, and what they will answer concerning what is revealed to them.

Incarnation and Atonement: An Anselmian Response to Aulén's *Christus Victor*

EUGENE R. FAIRWEATHER

In the spring of 1930 Gustaf Aulén, then professor of systematic theology in the University of Lund, delivered the Olaus Petri lectures at Uppsala.[1] A year later these lectures appeared in English as *Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of the Atonement*,[2] and for the past three decades they have played a considerable part in discussions of soteriology. In his introduction to the English edition Fr. A. G. Hebert, S.S.M., pointed out three potential benefits of Dr. Aulén's work. First and foremost, Aulén's exposition of the "classical" view of the atonement should help us to grasp the essential relation between the incarnation and the atonement—a crucial point at which other views had allegedly been defective. Secondly, it would lead us to the true understanding of the eucharistic liturgy as the sacramental "memorial" of the atonement, by removing those misconceptions of Christ's sacrifice which had led directly to serious misinterpretations of the eucharist. Thirdly, Aulén's study should bring new understanding of Luther's view of the work of Christ, as distinguished from the later teaching of protestant orthodoxy, with all that such new understanding might mean for our estimate of the Reformation, and so for the work of Christian reunion. Any one of these three suggestions would repay extensive study. In these comments, however, I propose to concentrate on the first point, which is obviously fundamental, and to ask whether Aulén's treatment of the atonement is really compatible with a sound Christology. More particularly, since he deliberately challenges comparison with St. Anselm, I intend to inquire whether *Cur Deus Homo* does not in fact do justice to an essential aspect of Christology which Aulén ignores.

Since Aulén makes a great deal of the "classical" quality of the view of the atonement which he adopts, our study of his thesis may fittingly take an historical turn. If he is right in his reading of Christian history, there must be some connexion between the "classical" theory of the atonement and the catholic doctrine of the incarnation as this was worked out in the age of the ecumenical councils—that is to say, in the age when the "classical" soteriology presumably stood pretty well unchallenged.

1. *Den kristna försoningstanken* (Stockholm: Svenska kyrkans diakonistyrelses bokförlag, 1930).
2. London: SPCK, 1931.

On the other hand, if his history is faulty and it turns out that the authors of the classical Christology were not aware of those implications of their work which Aulén and Hebert find so obvious, or perhaps even that the so-called "classical" view of the atonement is irreconcilable with the essential concerns of the catholic Christology, then even on his own terms the value of Aulén's study will be drastically reduced. Strange as he would think it, we may discover that he must give place to Anselm as a faithful interpreter of the incarnation and the atonement in their essential unity.

The "important and original contribution" of Aulén's book, according to Hebert,

> is its strong delineation of the view of the Atonement which is summed up in such phrases as "Christus Victor," and "God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself"—the view that sets the Incarnation in direct connection with the Atonement and proclaims that it is God Himself who in Christ has delivered mankind from the power of evil. As soon as the meaning of this view is grasped, the patristic teaching at once stands out as a strong, clear, and consistent whole, and it becomes impossible to doubt that it is this view which also dominates the New Testament; it has therefore every right to be called the typical Christian view, or, in Dr. Aulén's phrase, the "classic" idea of the Atonement. Evidently, too, it is to be distinguished from the view which grew up in the West on the basis of the forensic idea of sin as trangression of law, and which received its first clear formulation from Anselm; for that view regards the Atonement as not in the full sense God's work, but rather as the act whereby man in Christ makes reparation for man's sin . . .[3]

That this is a fair enough account of what Aulén is trying to say, even a brief survey of his little book will indicate. For instance, he writes in his introductory chapter on "The Problem and its Answers" that

> the most marked difference between the "dramatic" type [i.e., the classical view] and the so-called "objective" type [e.g., the doctrine of Anselm] lies in the fact that it represents the work of Atonement or reconciliation as from first to last a work of God Himself, a *continuous* Divine work; while according to the other view, the act of Atonement has indeed its origin in God's will, but is, in its carrying-out, an offering made to God by Christ as man and on man's behalf, and may therefore be called a *discontinuous* Divine work.

Or again, expounding Augustine's teaching, he says that for the latter "the work of the Incarnate is the work of the Divine Love. This it is that overcomes the tyrants, and effects atonement between God and the world. It is one Divine work, the continuity of which is not interrupted by the idea of an offering made to God from man's side, from below."[4] In these and a number of other passages, Aulén makes it plain that his primary concern is with the conception of the atonement, not as a work of man, but as the "*continuous* Divine work" of God incarnate.

It is true that in some places he complicates his analysis by suggesting that what he really finds wrong with the traditional "objective" or "Latin"

3. *Christus Victor*, pp. v–vi.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 21f., 62.

doctrine of the atonement is not the idea of human activity *per se* so much as the legalism of the complex of ideas, such as "satisfaction," in which the doctrine is expressed. So, for example, he insists that "the Latin doctrine of the Atonement is closely related to the legalism characteristic of the mediaeval outlook," and in attempting to distinguish the teaching of the Epistle to the Hebrews from the Latin view he recognizes that the notion of a sacrifice offered to God is common to both, but argues that in the former "the Sacrifice of Christ is not made part of a legal scheme, as is the case when the sacrificial idea is used in the Latin doctrine of the Atonement."[5] On this showing we might suppose that it was its legalism that most urgently impelled Aulén to reject the Latin doctrine. But in fact it is something deeper, of which legalism is only a symptom, that really disturbs him. This something deeper he describes as a "cleavage between Incarnation and Atonement." For the "Latins," while God really became man, this truth is not organically connected with the doctrine of the atonement, which comes to be thought of quite simply as the act of man towards God. As Aulén puts it, in a summary of the teaching of the fathers and of Anselm respectively, "they show how God became incarnate that He might redeem; he teaches a human work of satisfaction, accomplished by Christ."[6]

Ultimately, then, Aulén's criterion for the assessment of theories of the atonement is a particular understanding of the incarnation and its purpose. True Christian faith confesses the eternal Word of God, "who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven, . . . and was made man," and the redemptive purpose was achieved only because the acts of the incarnate were really acts of God, in a sense which absolutely excludes the thought of an atoning work from man's side. It is true that there is a real twosidedness in the work of redemption as the "classical" view sees it, and this is exemplified in the way in which Hebrews "regards the Sacrifice of Christ both as God's own act of sacrifice and as a sacrifice offered to God." But this twosidedness must not be thought of in terms of "discontinuity." As Aulén puts it, in commenting on the form of the "classical" teaching characteristic of Athanasius, "the payment of the debt is God's own act, carried out by the Logos, while at the same time it is God who receives the payment." Or, as he says again in presenting his case against Anselm, "the crucial question is really this: Does Anselm treat the atoning work of Christ as the work of God Himself from start to finish?"[7]

It could be argued with some force that this is just what Anselm does, but Aulén does not think so, and in answering his own question in the negative he plainly reveals certain interesting Christological presuppositions. As he sees it, "Anselm *does not . . . give up his basic assumption* that the required satisfaction must be made by man." Indeed, Anselm's argument is solely concerned to show how this essential satisfaction must and can be

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 108, 94.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 36, 104.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 93, 73, 102.

made, and the outcome of the argument is the notion of Christ's atoning work as a human act. "It is indeed true," Aulén writes, "that Anselm and his successors treat the Atonement as in a sense God's work; God is the author of the plan, and He has sent His Son and ordered it so that the required satisfaction shall be made. Nevertheless, it is not in the full sense God's work of redemption." Then comes Aulén's famous symbol: "If the patristic idea of Incarnation and Redemption may be represented by a continuous line, leading obliquely downwards, the doctrine of Anselm will require a broken line; or, the line that leads downwards may be shown as crossed by a line leading from below upwards, to represent the satisfaction made to God by Christ as man." And finally Aulén argues: "The double-sidedness characteristic of the classic idea has disappeared. God is no longer regarded as *at once* the agent and the object of the reconciliation, but as *partly* the agent, as being the author of the plan, and *partly* the object, when the plan comes to be carried out."[8]

For the moment I am concerned, not with the adequacy of this account of Anselm's teaching, but with the broader issues which it raises. By now we should see pretty clearly how Aulén understands the incarnation, and this drives us to ask the critical question. It is agreed that there is a close correlation between the truths of the incarnation and the atonement; that the driving force of the Christological thinking of the early church was the concern to safeguard the reality of man's redemption in Christ; and that consequently the structure of the patristic Christology is a major clue to the fathers' understanding of the redemptive acts of God. Here then is the question. Does the classical Christology really point to the view of the atonement which Aulén puts forward as the fundamental motif of Christian soteriology? Or can it be that Aulén's doctrine of the atonement rests on a doctrine of the person of Christ which the fathers would have rejected—perhaps even did reject—as inadequate and erroneous?

II

The Christological issue is forcibly put by Sophronius of Jerusalem—the reason for introducing this particular father into the discussion will appear a bit further on—in his *Homily on the Annunciation of the Mother of God*. Sophonius mentions certain heretics ("wretches," he calls them) who "do not speak of the incarnation of the Word, or mention the union of the diverse essences (namely, the Godhead and the manhood), or proclaim his birth of the sacred virgin, who is truly Mother of God." Since, he goes on, all these truths are necessarily presupposed by the cross, the outcome of such heresy is a blasphemous misunderstanding of the cross, involving the notion of the suffering of the Godhead.[9] Quite specifically, my question is this: Does Aulén's treatment of the incarnation and the atonement lay him open to the same kind of anti-Monophysite polemic?

9. *P.G.*, 87, 3224.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 104f.

Of course, there is no doubt of the kind of answer Aulén himself would give. With the fathers, he repudiates both Appolinarianism, according to which the Logos replaces the rational soul in Christ, and Monophysitism, according to which the human in Christ is absorbed into the divine. The "classical" view of the atonement, he tells us, "does not at all mean that we have here a Docetic Christology, which would do less than justice to the true manhood of Christ . . . *His true manhood receives full emphasis.*"[10] Nonetheless, I am not sure that the great fathers and councils would agree that Aulén's emphasis on Christ's humanity was "full" enough. Let us pursue the question further.

It is hard to be as sure as Hebert seems to be that one has apprehended the patristic teaching as "a strong, clear, and consistent whole," but perhaps the story of the post-Chalcedonian struggle with Monophysitism in its various subtle forms will be as good a test case as any. More particularly, the prolonged controversy which ended when the sixth ecumenical council rounded out the work of the fourth has a significant lesson to teach us. In A.D. 681 the third council of Constantinople promulgated its dogmatic definition of the "two wills" in Christ. After asserting the two natures in the one *hypostasis* of Christ, in strict conformity to the formula of Chalcedon, the definition went on to state that each nature—the one manifested in truth in Christ's miracles, the other in his sufferings—wills and performs its own acts, in *koinōnia* with the other. From this the conclusion follows directly: "We confess two natural wills and operations [*physika thelēmata te kai energeias*], duly concurring for the salvation of the human race."[11] I suggest that this formula bears more directly on the assessment of Aulén's thesis than one might suspect at first glance.[12]

Obviously enough, the essence of the Monothelete dispute is the question of the reality of Christ's human will, but we need, here as elsewhere, to keep in mind the soteriological concern behind the Christological debate. The last sentence quoted above from the definitive conciliar formula gives succinct expression to the motive which had been operative on the catholic side from the beginning. In the *Synodical Epistle* addressed in A.D. 634 to Sergius of Constantinople by Sophronius of Jerusalem, which is generally regarded as the first major pronouncement on the Monothelete question, Sophronius had written: "It was God who allowed himself to suffer these things in the flesh, both saving us by his own sufferings and granting impassibility to us through them. . . . He himself willed to suffer and to act and to work humanly [*anthrōpinōs*] . . ."[13] Fifteen years later the influential Lateran council of A.D. 649 spoke in its profession of faith of the "perfect God and perfect man, one and the selfsame Jesus Christ, our Lord and

10. Aulén, *op.cit.*, p. 186f.
11. Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, 23rd ed. (Freiburg: Herder, 1937), no. 292.
12. It may not be irrelevant to note that Aulén's summary of the Monothelete controversy in his *Dogmhistoria*, 4th ed. (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1946), p. 69, shows no concern with its soteriological implications.
13. *P.G.*, 87, 3173.

God," as "divinely and humanly [*divine et humane*] willing and working our salvation," while canon 11 of the same council describes him as "naturally the agent of our salvation, by way of both his natures."[14] Moreover, Martin I, whose clarity and firmness were something of a compensation for the vagaries of the unhappy Honorius, elaborated the point in his opening speech at the first session of the council: "Through his human, that is, his created will and operation, he himself for our sake freely endured the things that are proper to human nature, that is to say, his saving sufferings, since he who is God above nature, willing humanly for our sakes, underwent hunger, thirst, contempt, sorrow and fear, and after all these things the trial of death, for our salvation." Similarly, in his speech at the fifth session he speaks of the incarnate as "humanly offering" his obedience for us to his God and Father.[15] In view of its congruity with contemporary Eastern teaching, to say nothing of Martin's own acquaintance with and considerable use of the Greek fathers and his apparent total abstinence from intoxicating Latin words like *satisfactio*, it would be rash to treat this evidence as narrowly Western. On the contrary, our other evidence suggests that it expresses the common mind of the church of the day concerning the mystery of our redemption.

We may now go on to ask whether it is not Anselm's doctrine, rather than Aulén's critique, that is really at one with the Chalcedonian Christology as fully articulated in the fight against Monotheletism. The duality in Anselm's teaching faithfully reflects the ideas of the fathers, and it is no less compatible in his thought than in theirs with the ultimate unity of Christ's person and work. We may admit that not everyone is happy with the "juridical" language of Anselm's argument.[16] The fact remains that his Christological presuppositions, with which his doctrine of the atonement is fully consistent, conform strictly to the patristic teaching. One could quote half of the *Cur Deus Homo* in support of this statement, but the following passage makes the point clearly enough for our purpose:

> No one save God can make it [the necessary satisfaction] and no one save man ought to make it; [therefore] it is necessary for a God-Man to make it. Now we must inquire how there can be a God-Man. For the divine and human natures cannot be changed into each other, so that the divine becomes human or the human divine. Nor can they be so mingled that a third nature, neither fully divine nor fully human, is produced from the two . . . The Man-God we are seeking cannot be produced from divine and human nature, either by the conversion of one into the other or by the destructive commingling of both into a third, because these things cannot be done, and if they could they

14. Mansi, *Conciliorum omnium amplissima collectio* (Florence, 1764), 10, 1150; Denzinger, *op.cit.*, no. 264.

15. Mansi, *op.cit.*, 875; 1146.

16. Hebert, for example, speaks of the "forensic idea of sin as transgression of law." For warnings against such superficial constructions of Anselm's doctrine, see J. McIntyre, *St. Anselm and His Critics* (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1954); R. D. Crouse, "The Augustinian Background of St. Anselm's Concept *Justitia*," *CJT*, 4 (1958), 111–119; E. R. Fairweather, " 'Iustitia Dei' as the 'ratio' of the incarnation," *Spicilegium Beccense*, 1 (Paris: Vrin, 1959), 327–335.

would be of no avail for the end we seek. Moreover, even if these two complete natures are said to be united in some way, but still man is one person and God another, so that the same person is not both God and man, the two natures cannot do what needs to be done. For God will not do it, because he does not owe it, and man will not do it, because he cannot. Therefore, for the God-Man to do this, the person who is to make this satisfaction must be both perfect God and perfect man, because none but true God can make it, and none but true man owes it. Thus, while it is necessary to find a God-Man in whom the integrity of both natures is preserved, it is no less necessary for these two complete natures to meet in one person, . . . for otherwise the same person could not be perfect God and perfect man.[17]

What is all this but the doctrine of Chalcedon and Leo the Great, of Sophronius and Martin, of the Lateran council and Constantinople III, and in very much the same terms? It is the divine Word who acts, but the Word has truly become flesh, and he acts *divine et humane*—in a divine and in a human manner. When Anselm so consistently and searchingly expounds the essence of man's redemption as a divine-human work, it is this patristic and conciliar vision of the divine humility in the incarnation that dominates his thinking.

From start to finish the argument is dominated by the action of God—of God who made man, of God who was made man to offer, in manhood, an acceptable satisfaction to the divine nature. There is duality, of course, in the sense that the satisfaction required and made is a human act, but there is an underlying unity in the fact that it is God's omnipotent love that makes an acceptable human act possible. Anselm is concerned at once to stress the truth that God alone can be man's Redeemer, and to show the real significance of his taking human nature and dying a human death.[18]

It may well be that Aulén's Christology so stresses the divine person of the Word as to make it impossible for him to take seriously the suggestion that Christ's human acts can have this kind of meaning. In that case he is right from his own standpoint in criticizing Anselm's teaching and the whole tradition which the latter represents. But in the light of the history of Christology he can hardly accuse Anselm of not taking the incarnation seriously, unless he is prepared to argue that it was the Monotheletes, and not the ecumenical councils, that really knew what the incarnation was about. There is no reason to think that he consciously intends to take this line, but the logic of his critique of Anselm will hardly let him go anywhere else. Thus it seems clear that his appeal to the historic catholic Christology against the "Latin" theology of redemption must be dismissed.

III

Aulén's patristic argument may have turned out to be shaky, but it is still possible to argue that, whatever the fathers may have said, the New

17. Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo*, II, 6–7. Translation from E. R. Fairweather (ed.), *A Scholastic Miscellany* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956), p. 151f.
18. "Introduction to Anselm of Canterbury," *Ibid.*, p. 56f.

Testament is on his side. Aulén himself, of course, looks confidently to the New Testament teaching as the ultimate basis of his view of the atonement. A detailed investigation of bibilical thought is beyond the scope of this brief study, but it may be useful, by way of an appendix to the main argument, to note one or two texts which seem to support the fathers and Anselm against Aulén on the point at issue.

One would like, above all, to see a full commentary from the latter on a familiar Pauline passage:

> If, because of one man's trespass, death reigned through that one man, much more will those who receive the abundance of grace and the free gift of righteousness reign in life through the one man Jesus Christ. Then as one man's trespass led to condemnation for all men, so one man's act of righteousness leads to acquittal and life for all men. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by one man's obedience many will be made righteous.[19]

Aulén does, as a matter of fact, comment indirectly on the passage in a remark on Irenaeus:

> The redemptive work is accomplished *by* the Logos *through* the Manhood as His instrument; for it could be accomplished by no power but that of God Himself. When Irenaeus speaks in this connection of the "obedience" of Christ, he has no thought of a human offering made to God from man's side, but rather that the Divine will wholly dominated the human life of the Word of God, and found perfect expression in His work.[20]

This is ingenious, but it is not accurate exegesis either of St. Irenaeus or of St. Paul. The latter's meaning, reproduced by the former, is quite clearly that the free gift of justification is won for sinners through the total human obedience of the righteous Christ. But if this is so then Aulén's argument is undermined at a crucial point in the New Testament itself.

One might also note the text of First Timothy: "There is one God, and there is one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a ransom for all" (I Tim. 2:5f.). Or one might refer to the emphasis of the Epistle to the Hebrews on the likeness of the High Priest to his brethren "in every respect" (Hebr. 2:17), as well as to its insistence on the real analogy between him who is a priest forever, after the order of Melchizedek, and "every high priest chosen from among men" (Hebr. 5:1). But there is no need to labour the point. To put it simply, setting aside all subsidiary questions of the legitimacy of such categories as "propitiation" and "satisfaction" as ways of expressing the fundamental truth, the New Testament again and again presents us with the human obedience and self-oblation of Christ as the divinely ordained means of man's reconciliation with God.

Both the New Testament and the fathers, then, encourage us to repudiate the claim, made by Aulén and reiterated by Hebert, that the so-called

19. Rom. 5:17–19. While the word "man" is supplied by the translators from v. 15 in each reference to Christ, this is simply to clarify the only possible meaning of the text.
20. *Christus Victor*, p. 50.

"classical" view of the atonement is implied in the patristic conception of the incarnation and intimated in the New Testament itself. The human spontaneity, volition and action of the incarnate Word, which that view so drastically devalues, are essential to the biblical and patristic understanding of man's redemption. In other words, the work of redemption must be symbolized by the downward line of the divine love in action, which elicits from its point of contact in human life an upward-springing line—the line of the sacrificial obedience of the manhood assumed by the Word. To forget that it all begins with the downward movement of the divine love, and that the whole redemptive action is the work of the divine Word, is no doubt to make room for human moralism and legalism, and here Aulén's warning is permanently valid. But to forget that the atonement is actually consummated by the Godward movement of the human will of the God-Man is to lapse into that kind of partial denial of the incarnation against which the greatest teachers of the ancient church fought so long and so wisely. Our faith rests on the taking of true manhood into God in such a way that its human action is permeated by divine life, power and worth. No doubt Aulén is right in seeing in the whole story the triumph of God over the powers of evil, but he goes desperately wrong in failing to recognize that the very heart of this divine triumph is the conquest of sin by the perfect human obedience of the Word made flesh. John Henry Newman shared his "classical" sense of the divine victory, but he saw more clearly how the victory was won.

O wisest love! that flesh and blood,
  Which did in Adam fail,
Should strive afresh against the foe,
  Should strive and should prevail;

And that a higher gift than grace
  Should flesh and blood refine,
God's presence and his very Self,
  And essence all-divine.

Nothing less than this proclamation of the divine-human victory over the evils that enslave mankind is the full gospel that can clearly and powerfully summon God's people to confess the faith of Christ crucified and manfully to fight under his banner against sin, the world, and the devil. In the end, then, we must say frankly that Aulén's "classical" theory is less than a truly evangelical theology of atonement.

"The Virgin Mary in a Reformation Theology": A Reply

W. H. F. CALOREN

In the October, 1960, number of this journal James A. Shuel presents an article suggesting that Protestantism is less than faithful to its theological tradition and to its current responsibility in ecumenical discussion when it shows little or no interest in what he calls "a serious Mariology." Such a doctrine he claims to find in the writings of Calvin. Now certainly there was no man truer to "early Christian theology" than John Calvin. Nor is it any other than this same reformer who claimed that he would not have hesitated to cross ten oceans in the interest of the unity of the Churches. It is surely novel, however, if not inaccurate, to envisage Calvin as one who considered it essential to the interests of truth or unity that the Virgin Mary should occupy "a place" in the theology and life of the Church. Indeed, the interested reader of Mr. Shuel's advice who goes back to Calvin finds, in fact, that the so-called "place" which Calvin defines for Mary has nothing whatever to do with Mariology of a supposedly "serious" kind which he seeks to attribute to him. Where, as a matter of interest, did Calvin stand in this regard? Let us re-examine some of Mr. Shuel's claims within the context of the working classifications which he sets up.

I

(i) Our author suggests, with respect to her physical agency in the incarnation, that "Calvin sees Mary's role as *virgin* mother as a safeguard of the truth that it is none other than the Son of God who became the Son of man" (p. 275f.). That Calvin defended the humanity of Christ by reference to his mother's role no one would claim to deny. However, not one of the eighteen references supplied in this section supports the equation which Mr. Shuel would like to make and does imply, namely that the virgin birth is equivalent to divine conception, hence that it is the virginity of Mary which "safeguards" the divinity of Christ. The salient feature about all of these texts in their entirety is the remarkable reticence of Calvin in speaking of the virginity of Mary when he is talking about the unique role of the Holy Spirit. The "heavenly and secret" manner of Christ's generation reflects nothing and relies upon nothing but the working of God alone. So far is Calvin from seeing "the title 'Mother of our Lord' as assuring us that it is none other than the Son of God who acts in man's redemption" (p. 276), that in the *Institutes*, Bk. I, Ch. 13, where he sets out his proof for

the divinity of Christ, Calvin does not so much as mention Christ's birth or his mother. It is to go misleadingly beyond the evidence, in fact, to imply that Calvin considered "Mother of our Lord" as in any manner constituting a "title." Rather than reading with our author (p. 276), in the *Institutes* II, xiv, 4: "The name of the Son of God is given to him who is born of a virgin, and the virgin herself is called the Mother of our Lord" let us read from the 1560 French edition of the *Institutes*: ". . . we see how the Scripture sings to us loud and clear that he who is to be born of the virgin Mary will be named Son of God (Lk. 1:32), and that this virgin is the mother of our Lord."[1] Anything titular here clearly belongs to Jesus and not to his mother. Is it not misleading that, in this same connection, Mr. Shuel should offer us the brief quotation, "The name denotes a unity of person in the two natures of Christ" (p. 276), when, in fact, the Latin text reads, "In her calling Mary the mother of her Lord there is an indication of the unity of person in the two natures of Christ . . ."?[2] The difference in nuance is clear. If the references cited by Shuel and the writings from which they come prove anything, it is that the divinity of Christ is assured and safeguarded by nothing other than the action of God Himself. In this regard, where Mr. Shuel shows a notable eagerness to associate virginity with "holiness," Mary's integrity with Christ's divinity—as on p. 277, "the virgin-conception effected by the operation of the Holy Spirit"—Calvin himself demonstrates a very careful reserve. For example, Mr. Shuel's own quotation which speaks of the intervention of the Holy Spirit in the interests of the purity of Christ contains no mention of the Virgin. A further statement in the early editions of the *Institutes* emphasizes this same caution of Calvin. It begins: "We confess therefore that he was born of the Virgin, in order to be recognized as the real son of Abraham and of David, as had been promised by the Law and the Prophets." Humanity is the point here, not divinity. When it comes to divinity Calvin goes on:

> . . . In tracing back the lineage of Jesus Christ as far as David and Abraham, we have greater assurance that our Redeemer is he who had been so long before foretold of God. It is therefore said that he was conceived by the Holy Spirit, because it was in no way fitting that he who was sent to purify others should have an impure and contaminated origin. Thus it was not right that the human body which the essence of God took for its habitation should be defiled by the universal corruption of men. So the Holy Spirit acted here, and overcame the usual law of nature by means of his wonderful and to us, unfathomable power. For he brought it about that Jesus was not spotted with any stain or carnal defilement, but that he was born with perfect holiness and purity. By this, therefore, faith is taught to seek with assurance all holiness in Jesus Christ, and to seek it in him alone, inasmuch as he, and no other, has been exempted in his conception from human corruption.[3]

1. Jean Calvin, *Institution de la religion chrestienne, Livre second* (Critical ed. by Jean-Daniel Benoit, Paris: Vrin, 1957).
2. Guilielmus *Baum et al.*, eds., *Ioannis Calvini Opera* (Brunsvigae,1891), Vol. 45, "Commentarius in Harmoniam Evangelicam," col. 35: *Quod Mariam appellat Domini sui matrem, notatur personae unitas in duabus Christi naturis, . . .*
3. *Inst.*, II, xiv, 4 (ed. Benoit, p. 257).

Not a hint of the person of the Virgin compromises the primacy of the Holy Spirit in this statement of the mystery of Christ's divinity.

Furthermore, far from pointing the way to any rank for Mary within the Church because of her motherhood of Jesus, the *Institutes,* Bk. II, Ch. 13, Sec. 3 (cited by our author, p. 277), emphasize that her function was that of an ordinary, normal woman. As such she is one with Rahab, mother of Booz. Indeed, what she, the Virgin, represents, is something quite "ordinary in nature."

(ii) Mr. Shuel does well in this section to admit that Calvin was "more cautious," and to try to follow the example himself. One wonders, however, just where in the reformer's writings he finds support for the insinuations conveyed by the statement that Mary's "response involves her, in an analogical sense, in a co-operation with God that bears not only on her own salvation, but on that of all mankind" (p. 279). This is the kind of language which prepares the way for Mary's accession to the right hand of God, that "unbalanced 'Marianism' " which our author supposedly deplores. Calvin's careful language on the other hand, locates her squarely in the midst of the common men and women to whom he recommends her example of faith and obedience as the means, the utterly human means, by which God works to the salvation of men.

For good reason are the two occurrences of "blessed" in the citation found on p. 280 enclosed in quotation marks. They mislead nonetheless. For the text at these points reads "happy" (*felix* and *beata*) and not "blessed" (*benedicta*). And the context makes abundantly clear that it is felicity and not a special consecration which is in question. That Calvin was cautious in the use of his terminology is clear from his comment on Luke 1:28, where the text before him read, "The Lord is with you, you are blessed (*benedicta*) among women." He writes: "For it is not to be taken, in my judgement, as a title to glory; rather it designates happiness."[4] It goes without saying that Calvin did not understand the word in the shallow, subjective way in which we so often understand "happiness" today.

The question is not simply one of words, but of what is conveyed by the terms. It is definitely misleading to see in Calvin any idea of a special "setting apart" or consecration of Mary to a unique position on account of her becoming the mother of Jesus. "Blessing" in the sense of happiness, felicity at the hands of God: Yes. "Blessing" in the sense of being accorded privilege or superior status in the Church or order of salvation: No.

(iii) What then, is the significance of the supposedly "unique position as first within the Church" (p. 280) which Calvin reputedly claims for Mary? Surely Mr. Shuel does not find in any of the references he cites, or anywhere else in Calvin, the evidence to support his apparently hierarchical notion of priority? Surely her priority is that which the example of correct conduct

4. *Ioannis Calvini Opera*, Vol. 45, col. 25: *Benedictionem enim tanquam effectum et probationem divini favoris ponit. Neque enim pro laude hic, meo iudicio, capitur, sed potius felicitatem notat.*

must have over any one who is less exemplary. Surely the import of these references is that her authority is that of the faithful believer whose life and word point all men, as a road-sign, to their only sure salvation in the Son. Her authority for others resides in the assurance *about* God that she has *from* God. For this assurance about himself God wills all men to accept by beholding her witness. It is significant however, that Calvin nowhere hints of attributing to Mary an authority comparable to that of the Prophets and Apostles. Her claim upon men is that exercised by every Christian. It is the claim of faith upon lack of faith. To talk, therefore, of her unique position within the Church takes one far from the theology of John Calvin.

And what of the honours supposedly due to her in recognition of her unique service (p. 282)? The honour Mr. Shuel has in mind differs, apparently, from that of Calvin, for in quoting (p. 282) from the *Commentary on the Harmony of the Evangelists* our author not only takes up the reformer's thought in the middle of a sentence, but in so doing he leaves out a part of the sentence which noticeably alters the idea contained in that which he does render. Here is what precedes:

> Elizabeth therefore pronounces here that her cousin is blessed because of the blessedness of the Son. Now inasmuch as it was not Mary's greatest felicity to bear Christ in her womb, but only an honour that God gave her in second place (for the first and central point of her well-being was to be reborn into the new life by the Spirit of Christ), nonetheless, not without cause is she called blessed . . .[5]

It is, in fact, less "plain" throughout Calvin's work than Mr. Shuel would have us believe, that the reformer considers that "God's choice of Mary as the mother of the Redeemer, and the integral relationship of our redemption to Mary's role, require that a deliberate recognition be given to Mary by the Church" (p. 282). Let us rather listen to Calvin himself:

> Now the Virgin is treasurer of grace in another manner [than that conceived by the Papists]. How so? Because she kept the teaching, that which today opens for us the kingdom of heaven, that which leads us to our Saviour Jesus Christ; she kept that as a trust, and now by means of her we have received it; and by it we are edified today. Here then is the honour which God has accorded her; here is the way in which we should look to her; not in order to stop with her, nor to make of her an idol, but in order that by means of her we may be led to our Saviour Jesus Christ, seeing that it is to him indeed that she sends us back. And yet we are taught by the example of the holy Virgin, to receive the word more carefully and more attentively than we have been accustomed to.[6]

II

If there is still some doubt as to what was Calvin's attitude to "Marianism" within the framework of the Roman church, perhaps Mr. Shuel will permit us to hear him further:

5. *Ibid.*, col. 35, comment on Lk. 1:42; translation after the French text, *Commentaires de Jehan Calvin sur le Nouveau Testament,* Tome premier (Toulouse, Société des Livres Religieux, 1892).
6. *Ioannis Calvini Opera,* Vol. 46, sermon 25 on Lk. 2:15–19, col. 308.

But as to the Papists, it is certain that they make of the virgin Mary an idol. For in according to her the office of advocate, in claiming that she mediates between God and men, that she is the life, the light, and the hope, what shall remain any more for our Saviour Jesus Christ to do? Is he not stripped in this way of the priesthood which was given to him by God his Father? It is just the same for all their patrons which they delude themselves into believing.[7]

It can hardly be said that Roman Catholic Mariology has undergone any recent developments which would have further recommended it in the opinion of Calvin. Mr. Shuel misleads us in suggesting that on this point Calvin offers us common ground with the Roman communion. Actually we have every reason, indeed more since his day, for accepting fully Calvin's stern judgement upon the place that Mary occupies in Roman theology and the Roman church. If Mr. Shuel's honest impression is that the Reformed tradition has no more legitimate contribution than this, no better "convincing alternative to the unbalanced 'Marianism' " of the Roman church, to offer to the ecumenical discussion, then indeed, let us who share that tradition begin our re-reading of Calvin! For if that is really the case we surely have been faithless to our theological heritage. One suspects, however, that if Mr. Shuel had read Calvin the way Calvin should be read, he would never have had to pose his question. For to the inquiry as to whether "the essential doctrinal principles" of the Reformed tradition "necessarily impose on its adherents either the inhibited silence or the automatic rejection of a serious Mariology," the reformer himself replies most clearly: "Let this then be a sure axiom—that there is no word of God to which place should be given in the Church save that which is contained, first in the Law and the Prophets; and, secondly, in the writings of the Apostles, and that the only due method of teaching in the Church is according to the prescription rule of his word."[8] Is this what we call "inhibition"?

"If any man speak, let him speak as the oracles of God" (I Peter 4:11) . . . What else is this than to banish all the inventions of the human mind (whatever be the head which may have devised them), that the pure word of God may be taught and learned in the Church of the faithful,—than to discard the decrees, or rather fictions of men (whatever be their rank), that the decrees of God alone may remain steadfast?[9]

Surely there is nothing "automatic" about this?

Mr. Shuel has obviously overlooked a statement of Calvin, which, far from supporting his suggestion for a *rapprochement* of the churches on the grounds of "a serious Mariology," ventures the idea that it is this very compromise of a basic Reformation position and principle which makes for disunity. In a passage where he describes the teaching power of the Church, Calvin goes on:

7. *Ioannis Calvini Opera*, Vol. 29, sermon on Deut. 34, col. 213.
8. *Institutes*, IV, viii, 8.
9. *Institutes*, IV, viii, 9.

God deprives man of the power of producing any new doctrine in order that he alone may be our master in spiritual teaching, as he alone is true, and can neither lie nor deceive. This reason applies not less to the whole Church than to every individual believer.

10. But if this power of the church which is here described be contrasted with that which spiritual tyrants, falsely styling themselves bishops and religious prelates, have now for several ages exercised among the people of God, *there will be no more agreement than that of Christ and Belial.*[10]

Calvin advises another path towards unity: "Herein is the unity of the faith happily realised, when all, from the highest to the lowest, aspire to the head."[11] As to who that person was, the reformer leaves no possible doubt.

10. *Institutes*, IV, viii, 9–10; italics mine.
11. *Institutes*, IV, i, 5.

Some Theological Pressures Towards Christian Unity

R. H. L. WILLIAMS

THE ORIGIN, the inspiration and the strength of ecumenical thinking lies in the biblical theology of Christian unity. Nevertheless it is true that many who support the Ecumenical Movement do so for reasons which are plainly non-theological. The origin of their concern is to be found in their vision of the needs of the world, and of the dangers which the world presents to a disunited Church. There is nothing wrong with their thinking, so far as it goes, provided that those whose ideas spring solely from this source recognise the fact that their thinking is non-theological, and represents what is basically a counsel of expediency. The real strength of the Ecumenical Movement, however, and indeed its only hope of true success, is to be found in the biblical theology of Christian unity which constitutes its groundwork.

Since this essay is concerned with some features of the theology of Christian unity it will be of help here to make an elementary distinction between the theology of Christian unity and the theology of ecclesiastical reunion. The former is the pure science, and the latter is a department of the applied science which arises from it. The first deals with the spiritual realities which constitute the Church's true nature, the second seeks to apply these to the healing of the Church's divisions. It is of primary importance in ecumenical thinking that the theology of ecclesiastical reunion should be both inspired and governed by the theology of Christian unity. And it is of like importance that the theology of Christian unity be derived from the biblical doctrine of the Church. I propose, therefore, to examine the five great New Testament metaphors which depict the Church's basic nature, and I shall seek to relate them to the concept of Christian unity. These metaphors occur most frequently in the epistles of St. Paul, and it is significant that Paul's great missionary and evangelistic fervour should be accompanied by an intense desire for unity amongst true followers of Jesus. In this connexion it is worth nothing that a great deal of the most convinced and inspiring leadership in the Ecumenical Movement today comes from missionary thinkers and their "young churches." Those who are most fully engaged in the primary Christian activities are usually best able to "hear the word of the Lord."

The metaphors to which I refer do not appear in any ordered sequence in the New Testament, and nowhere do we find any suggestion that, viewed

collectively, they represent any logical progression of thought. Nevertheless, when seen together, they do arrange themselves quite naturally into a logical sequence, and it is in this sequence that we shall study them here. This sequence suggests a progressive element in the nature of the Church's relationship to God, and this in itself is not without value. Here then are the metaphors, arranged in the sequence which appears to be logical: (1) The Church is as one espoused, or engaged, or betrothed to Christ, as a chaste virgin (II Cor. 2:2–4); (2) The Church is the Bride of Christ (an image suggested in many passages, e.g., Ephes. 5: 30–31, and echoed in Rev. 21:2); (3) The Church is "one flesh" with Christ (Ephes. 5: 29–32); (4) The Church is the Body of Christ, of which he is the head (Ephes. 1:22–23); (5) The Church is to be a holy temple for the habitation of God through the Spirit (Ephes. 2:21–22).

When the metaphors are arranged in this order, the sequence of their ideas suggests that the relationship between God and his Church is a progressive one and, inasmuch as all these metaphors are simultaneously applicable to the Church, we may deduce that the activity of development is a permanently contemporary element in the life of the Church. This is an important thought, for it means that we are involved in such a development ourselves.

The nature of the progression is clear. In the first place there is the image of betrothal. The Church is to be as a chaste virgin, betrothed to Christ. In the second place the Church is to be as Christ's Bride. The fundamental idea of the previous metaphor has now been carried forward to its logical development, represented by the act of marriage. In the third place, the Church is described as being "one flesh" with Christ. The term "one flesh" refers to the state of integration and unity which is achieved in a true marriage. In the fourth place the Church is described as the Body of Christ, and it is only when the "one flesh" relationship has been achieved that we can begin to think in these terms. In the final metaphor, the concept of the Church as the Body of Christ is illuminated by the vision of that Body actually constituting a temple. We simply note that a temple exists for the worship of God, and for the manifestation of his praise.

Now the assumptions which underlie biblical metaphors must be considered no less carefully than the metaphors themselves, and the assumption upon which each of these metaphors is founded is a striking one. Each metaphor assumes, as a necessary and definitive fact, that the Church is a unity. The unity of the Church is assumed as a fact in the use of symbols which depict it successively as a *fiancée*, as a bride, as a marriage partner, as a body, as a temple. In each case the symbol employed is capable neither of division nor of multiplication. These metaphors, considered individually, and in their ordered sequence, represent the Church as one unit, and therefore account for one Church only, other than which there is none. Let us examine each of these metaphors in turn, and see what each one implies for the theology of Christian unity.

(1) The first metaphor, that of the Church as a chaste *fiancée*, is of immediate importance in this connexion. The betrothal of two people is an act in which the conditions of a marriage contract are recognized, affirmed and accepted. This act of recognition, affirmation and acceptance, required by God of his people, is an act which, immediately upon its performance, creates a measure of unity amongst them. This fact reveals the basic relevance of this metaphor to the theology of Christian unity, for in it we see implied those preliminary conditions which God imposes upon our possible relationship to him, a relationship which, in its full maturity, attains to the unity of one body, the body of Christ.

These conditions may be summarized as follows. The Church must be separated from other possible "suitors," namely "false gods." The Church must possess love and loyalty to Christ, to whom she is betrothed. The Church must be faithful to the covenant of betrothal. And we may also suggest that, as the Church fulfils these conditions, she will be united in a forward-looking and expectant hope concerning the "marriage day." In so far, then, as the Church is willing to fulfil the requirements of God, as these are suggested by the metaphor of betrothal, the Church will be characterized by a spirit of dedication, affection, loyalty, hope and expectation. These are unifying virtues and, when they are the common possession of all Christian people, the measure of unity which they create will be considerable.

One further point may be made concerning the implications of this metaphor. The unifying virtues which it implies have the focal point of their activity in Christ. The Church is betrothed to him. Her love and her loyalty, her hope, her expectation and her spirit of dedication are all directed to him. Such an attitude to the person of Christ is known as piety, and we cannot but conclude that such a piety must be a fundamental and necessary element in the life of all churches striving for unity. Such a piety is the very soul of many small conservative congregations, even of congregations which are sectarian and reactionary in outlook, and which are opposed to the Ecumenical Movement. Yet the Church of God, of which they are a part, needs their piety, and deprived of it will be the poorer.

(2) The second metaphor, that of the Church as the Bride of Christ, has a similar relevance to the theology of Christian unity. The ideas implicit in this metaphor may be analysed as follows. The word "bride" is used of the female party in the marriage contract, chiefly in relation to the events of the marriage day itself. A woman is really only a bride within the period of the wedding ceremonies and celebrations; thereafter she is not the bride but the wife. Therefore the word "bride" is a term which signifies to us the actions performed by a woman during the ceremonies and celebrations of her wedding. It is a term which denotes action. The nature of the action which it denotes is determined by the nature of the estate of marriage.

Concerning the estate of marriage, we may say that it is characterized by three essential features. (i) It is a covenanted relationship in which each partner assumes permanent responsibility for the care and welfare of the other, and for faithfulness together. (ii) It is a shared life in which that

which belongs to each is available to either. (iii) It is a life dedicated to fruitfulness. (A childless marriage can, of course, be abundantly fruitful.) Consequently the act required of a bride is a threefold one. She is to enter into a permanent and responsible covenant; she is to share her whole life with her partner; she is to offer herself to a life of fruitfulness. It is clear, then, that when the Church is described as being the Bride of Christ, the Church is thought of as a body of people actively engaged in the performance of this same threefold act. It is in this act that the bride reciprocates the love of the one who has been her suitor. It is in a similar threefold act that the Church, as Christ's Bride, reciprocates the love of her Lord. The Church, therefore, is a body of people which reciprocates God's love by gladly entering into a covenanted relationship with him; by sharing its life and talents with him; and by embarking upon a life dedicated to fruitfulness.

In relating this metaphor to the subject of Christian unity one immediately is faced by this question: "How can a divided Church do any of these things adequately?" A divided Church can only pledge itself to God in a piecemeal way; a divided Church can only share its life with God in a piecemeal way; a divided Church cannot bear fruit an hundredfold. If the Church is truly to be the Bride of Christ, rising up and saying "I will" to the plighted troth of God, it must unquestionably be a united church, acting with deliberate conviction.

(3) In the third metaphor we have the concept of the Church as being "one flesh" with Christ. The "one flesh" relationship is the creation of a true marriage, and the implications of this metaphor are impressive. If such a relationship is to be achieved, a unified personality is required of each party. A husband or wife whose personality is not unified by his or her love for the other cannot truly attain to the "one-flesh" relationship. For such a relationship to exist between God and his Church requires of the Church a unified personality.

One other observation may be made concerning the the relevance of this metaphor to our subject. The unity achieved between man and woman in a happy marriage is one of diverse and sovereign personalities. What this implies for the relationship of God and his Church is plain: this also is a unity of diverse entities, for in it the Holy and eternal God is united with a redeemed but still sinful fellowship of people. The diversity which exists between Christ and his Church needs to be recognized if the miracle of Calvary is to be in the smallest degree comprehended.

(4) The third metaphor, it must be noted, depicts the relationship of the Church with Christ. It does not depict the relationship of believer with believer. It is the fourth metaphor which portrays for us the nature of the mutual relationship of individual Christians and church groups within the family of God. In this metaphor of the "Body of Christ" we have the great theological fact which will be the basis of any true Church unity. The significance of this concept may be seen most clearly when we firmly differentiate it from the previous one which portrays the Church as being "one flesh" with Christ. The unity of the Church with Christ is, as we have seen, one

of diversity. But the unity of Christian people with each other is the same sort of unity as that possessed by a single living body, for the Church is the Body of Christ.

Now the unity possessed by a single body is not a unity of diversity. It is a unity of homogeneity. Therefore the unity of Christian people is not such that it can be symbolized by the unity of two marriage partners. It is such that it can only adequately be expressed by the symbol of a single body. Christians, therefore, must recognize that they are homogeneously one with all others who, by baptism and the Holy Ghost, are united with God. The churches of the world must likewise recognize that, within the mind and purpose of God, they too are homogeneously one.

It is only when this homogeneity is acknowledged that one can profitably, or even accurately, discuss the diversity of Christendom. There can of course be no doubt that the churches of the world represent a wide diversity of ecclesiastical structures and theological thought-patterns, born of a great diversity of activity and enthusiasm within the fellowship of believers. This undeniable fact prompts many people to speak of Christian unity as being essentially a unity of diversity. But this, I feel, is misleading. Even in its diversity, Christian unity must theologically be a homogeneous unity. Indeed the human body homogeneously units, integrates and harmonizes a multitude of diverse elements. This is the fact which St. Paul is emphasizing when he says "There is one body, and one spirit, . . . one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all" (Ephes. 4:4ff.).

Of course the nature of the Body of Christ determines the number of the differentiated elements of which it is composed, and also dictates the nature of their respective functions and the conditions of their inter-relationship. That is why the truths embodied in this concept of the Church are fundamental to any schemes of ecclesiastical reunion. No doubt one good thing which emerges from the period of the Church's divisions will be a theology of the Church wrought from a self-knowledge of which it would have been incapable apart from (what one has faith will prove to be) its temporary fragmentation and the intense spiritual and intellectual struggle out of which, pray God, it will grow into unity. This surely must be the will of God, if the metaphor of the Church as constituting the Body of Christ finds its origin in his mind, as we faithfully believe it does. For not only does the nature of the Body of Christ determine the number and the nature of its component elements, but it also provides them with the sphere in which they may grow and work together in creative harmony.

(5) The fifth and last metaphor depicting the biblical concept of the Church is that of a holy temple, built for the habitation of God through the Spirit.

First we must note that the fellowship of the redeemed has an intended design, the design of a temple. The Christian Church is not intended by its builder and maker to be a formless polyglot of accidental Christian groups

huddled together like the hovels of a spiritual shanty town. It is intended to be built together into a purposeful and beautiful design. We must note, however, that the metaphor does not depict the Church as a finished temple; the Church is described as a building which is growing into a temple. The building, "fitly framed together, groweth into a holy temple in the Lord" (Ephes. 2:21). The verb itself and its tense (groweth) argue that the Church it not a finished creation, and that the completion of the building will be the result of one thing only—growth. At present we constitute a "habitation" for God through the Spirit. We do not yet constitute a finished temple.

The picture of the Church which is presented to us here is bristling with significance. For any structure to be growing towards its perfection argues the existence of a foundation already laid and plans in accordance with which the work of building is being carried forward. We know indeed that the foundation is Jesus Christ himself. The full plans are known only to God, but we believe that in Holy Scripture we have been presented with basic specifications and a glimpse of the working model. Upon the spiritual foundation of the character, spirit and work of Jesus Christ, the Church of today has grown out of the working model which sprang into undying life on the first Whitsunday.

Each of the varied traditions which have subsequently grown up within the Church contains features of the temple which exist in the mind of the Maker. Each tradition also contains its own peculiar inadequacies. As we bring the study of these virtues and inadequacies into the sphere of the theology of Christian unity, the world-wide Church will be admitted into a deeper self-knowledge than she has ever before enjoyed. This self-knowledge will furnish us with the working drawings from which the labour of building the temple can go forward.

Having sought thus briefly to relate the implications of these five metaphors to the theology of Christian unity, one is more aware than ever of the impact which this theology must inevitably make upon the spirituality of our day. By their profoundly intimate and radically personal character these metaphors relate the whole concept of Christian unity directly to the love which the individual Christian bears for Christ. For "he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God, whom he hath not seen?" (I John 4:20).

A concern for Christian unity which is theological in its origin must present a challenge which is spiritual in its nature. Where this challenge is squarely met, it rouses Christian people to work and pray, and the labour demanded by this challenge involves the same degree of sacrifice, and love, and discipline, and piety as is demanded by worship, evangelism, pastoral work, or any other Christian activity, for the Christian life is in itself a profound unity, expressing in its multifarious activities the nature of the relationship which exists between Christ and his Church.

The great proclamation of the Bible is that unity can be achieved, but

only at a price. That price will not be—indeed, in the very nature of the case cannot be—the surrender of any dogma of the faith. The price will be that of the Cross. As we are prepared, both as individuals and as denominations, to follow the Crucified and share his burden, so the Church will grow towards unity; for unity, is, as we have seen, the fruit of growth. And this brings us to the basic element in the challenge which the theology of Christian unity brings to the Church today. Unity can only come from growth. Growth can only come from life. Life can only come from God, as we are baptized into the death and resurrection of Christ. And so the cause of Christian unity takes its life, as all else that is Christian takes its life, from the death and resurrection of Jesus our Lord, by whose stripes we are healed.

The Centrality of Baptism in Pastoral Strategy

ERIC G. JAY

THIS ARTICLE is written by an Anglican who has in mind primarily the problems which the administration of Baptism in a semi-Christian community poses for many of the parish clergy. Although this discussion is conducted with the Anglican situation mainly in view, it is hoped that it may be found not entirely irrelevant for other churches confronted with similar problems.

Baptism in Anglican teaching is a sacrament "generally necessary to salvation"; and perhaps it is still not altogether unnecessary to point out that in the Prayer Book Catechism the word "generally" has not the modern and inaccurate sense of "usually, but not always," but the strict sense of "for the genus, for the whole race." Baptism belongs to God's purpose for all men. Although it is sometimes called one of the "occasional offices," this phrase must not be taken to imply that it is of minor importance. On the contrary, the purpose of this article is to make the plea that Holy Baptism should be given a much more important place than it often has in the work of the parish; that the administration of Baptism should be the starting-point of the larger part of the parish priest's work; that in the larger parishes where a single-handed priest, faced with the question of priorities, has the difficult task of deciding which among his many duties simply have to be left undone, his strategy ought to be to make the administration of Baptism the centre of his work; and that even in smaller parishes Baptism ought to be the parish priest's very special concern.

I

Many of the clergy are greatly perturbed by what is called "indiscriminate baptism," the practice of baptizing all children who are brought to the Church, even though parents and godparents may not be members of the Church or even practising Christians at all. In such cases the children are rarely brought later to the Sunday School or for preparation for Confirmation; the parents never attend the Church. It would seem that Baptism is regarded by them as a social convention, or even as a piece of superstition which it is wise to invoke for one's children. To administer Baptism in these circumstances appears to condone this view. Some, therefore, are wondering whether the Baptist Church and other Christian bodies which oppose infant

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY, Vol. VII (1961), No. 3

Baptism altogether are not in a stronger position, and one which is closer to the New Testament teaching on Baptism.

Another article would be required if we were to attempt to discuss the question of Infant Baptism with any completeness. Anglicans adhere to the practice of baptizing infants. Here it can only briefly be stated why they do so. They maintain that it is justified both by the theology of the New Testament and in the long tradition of the Church.

Its scriptural justification is based on the doctrine of the Covenant. According to the Old Testament, Israel, by God's initiative, became his elect people, and through its representatives entered into a Covenant relationship with God. The seal of this Covenant was circumcision, God's sign to each member of the nation that he was brought within the Covenant, and made heir to its privileges and responsibilities. In accordance with the strong Hebrew sense of the solidarity of the family, as well as of the whole people, children were included. Male children were circumcised a week after birth. In the New Testament the Church is presented as the New Israel. There is a wealth of language, both direct and allusive, which identifies the Christian Church with a reconstituted Israel (e.g., John 15:5; Rom. 9–11; Gal. 3:7, 9, 29; James 1:1; I Pet. 1:1–2; 2:9–10). The Church, through Jesus Christ, has entered into a new Covenant with God (Heb. 9:15; 13:20–21). The seal of this Covenant is a "circumcision made without hands," or Baptism (Col. 2:11–12); a seal not in the flesh, but in the Spirit (Rom. 2:29; II Cor. 1:22; Ephes. 1:13; 4:30). The close parallelism with the doctrine of the Old Covenant makes the conclusion that children were to be included well-nigh inevitable.

Anglicans also regard it as significant that from very early times the Baptism of infants was normal. Early Christian literature says nothing of any controversy within the Church on this matter (though Tertullian in his Montanist days argues against the practice). This indicates that there was no consciousness of innovation on the part of the Church. It is strong support for the view that the Baptism of children was normal practice in New Testament days, and gives substance to the interpretation of the references to the baptizing of households (Acts 16:15; 17:33) as including children.

The instances of Baptism given in the Acts of the Apostles show that an expression of penitence and a profession of faith was required. These instances all relate to adults, for the Acts is describing a missionary situation in which adults were naturally the first to receive Baptism. Anglicans do not deduce from this that Baptism cannot be administered to those who are incapable of any such profession (among whom, be it noted, would be not only children, but also the mentally deficient of any age). The Church, being entrusted with the administration of this Sacrament, must as part of its binding and loosing authority look for proper dispositions in all who seek Baptism. In adults penitence and a profession of faith are clearly called for. Infants are not capable of these things. But the Church

has never held that this is a reason for denying to them (or to adult imbeciles) membership of Christ's visible Body on earth. On the contrary, it has held, in complete accord with the whole New Testament idea of the Covenant relationship, that there is good reason to bring the children of believing parents into the family of Christ's Church. The faith of parents and of others who have brought, and the faith of the Church which receives, the child has been held as a guarantee that the child would be nurtured in the Christian faith and life.

It is the comparatively recent practice by which unbelievers and nominal Christians bring their children to Baptism which causes most of our modern perplexities. This situation is never envisaged in the New Testament, and therefore it may be expected that it will pose problems. But there are some who see no problem here and who hold that Baptism must be administered in all circumstances. This position is usually based on a doctrine of original guilt, and a view of the Sacrament of Baptism as a piece of machinery for removing such guilt. Every baby inherits original sin, it is argued, and is therefore involved in guilt. Baptism remits sin, and must be administered to children as quickly as possible, for if they die without it they will be excluded from heaven. This argument is used to justify the practice of baptizing unborn babies within the womb if there is a danger of immediate death; and in the past forcible Baptism has been similarly justified. Such a doctrine and such practices do not attribute to God even "common sense," still less justice and mercy. All men from birth undoubtedly have an inherited defect for which the theological term "original sin" is used. But this does not imply the *personal guilt* of every infant. Article 9 of the Thirty-Nine Articles ("on original or birth sin") though strongly Augustinian, just avoids, by its use of impersonal language, asserting a doctrine of personal guilt for "original sin." It ought to be remembered that "original sin" is not a Scriptural phrase; and that when the adjective "original" is attached to the noun "sin," the connotation of the latter is changed. It cannot here mean a state of wilful disobedience to God which is the strict meaning of the word "sin." An original defect in man (i.e., at birth) is clearly not a matter of his *personal* guilt.

The administering of Baptism to infants cannot rightly be based on any such idea. It rests rather on our Lord's will expressed in his words, "Suffer the little Children to come unto me and forbid them not," and on the New Testament teaching that Baptism is the way in which people normally come to him. This is entirely consonant, as we have seen, with the biblical concepts of the Covenant and of family solidarity. But does this mean that we must baptize all children who are presented, whatever the circumstances? Some priests in England, gravely perturbed by the harm done both to the Church and to the families concerned by baptizing the children of those who apparently have no intention of bringing them up to be faithful Church members, have taken a stand by refusing Baptism in these circumstances. This is an unpopular line to take. It is possible to sympathize with

their concern and to admire their moral courage without believing them to be entirely right. It cannot, for instance, be right to deprive children of the benefits of Baptism if the main motive is to give careless parents a sharp lesson. But it is contended that it is wrong to dispense holy things when there is no guarantee and apparently no likelihood that those holy things will be rightly used. The present writer would agree that if a priest were absolutely certain that the motives of parents in bringing a child to Baptism were wholly superstitious, and that the child would be given no opportunity of living a Christian life, he would have to act on our Lord's injunction not to cast pearls before swine, and refuse to baptize. But how often can we have such certainty? Motives are often mixed. There may be a streak of superstition, a certain wish to conform to what is thought to be a respectable social pattern; but at the same time, ill-thought-out as it may be, there is usually the belief or hope that God will give a blessing to the child. Do we dare to assume that God will not, or cannot, with his grace build on the gifts of Baptism? Are we to be committed to a position which implies that careless parents can ultimately thwart God's purpose for a child?

The situation we are envisaging should be viewed as offering a splendid pastoral opportunity which has too often in the past been lost: an opportunity to ensure that the parents do no remain careless; an opporunity to begin to build up into Christ another immortal soul. If this opportunity is to be seized, two things are needful. There must be a solid background of teaching in the congregation at large about the supreme importance of Baptism; and we need to set up a practice and discipline which comes into operation as soon as there is a request for Baptism.

II

Let the parish priest ask himself, "When did I last preach a sermon about Baptism? Have I *ever* preached a sermon about Baptism? Have I ever arranged a teaching course for my congregation which includes instruction about Baptism—why it is a sacrament, and what a sacrament is, what Baptism means, and what God does thereby, and why the Church thinks it important?" If these things have not been done, or have been done only half-heartedly, it is not surprising if members of the congregation have an inadequate conception of the importance of Baptism. Even regular Church people will regard it as something appropriate for children, but otherwise as having little significance for the life of an individual or of the Church. Quite clearly those who are not regular Church people will have an even more casual attitude. And this will be the parish priest's fault. Each parish priest should have two or three sermons for the general congregation on the meaning and importance of Baptism, and should preach one of them every year. If they are good sermons they will bear repeating. He ought also to work out a short course of instruction which will teach the

same things at greater length; and every two or three years this course should be given on week-day evenings in the fall or during Lent, and the congregation should be encouraged to be present as a matter of importance. If this is faithfully done, there will not for long be room for doubt in the minds of the congregation that Baptism is of very great importance for the life of the Church; that it is the way of entry into his Church ordained by Jesus Christ; that it confers the status of "Christian" on the one who is baptized; that, therefore, those who bring a child to Baptism should be made fully aware of what they are doing; that Baptism is the starting-point of a life which God desires to enrich continually with grace; that, therefore, the child must be nurtured in the Christian life, and taught to look for God's grace. When these truths are grasped by the congregation, there will be a greater likelihood that the parish at large will begin to understand the significance of Baptism.

When the congregation thus comes to know, and other people are beginning to realize, the meaning of Baptism, it will be generally understood (and indeed expected) that a great deal of care must be taken about the Baptism of every child. The following suggests a scheme by which in every parish such care can be shown.

(*a*) *Notice of Baptism.* Adequate notice, at least a fortnight before the proposed day, must be given of the desire for Baptism. This must be insisted on against all attempts to evade it. The parish priest will sometimes be told that if the Baptism cannot take place when the family want it, perhaps in only two or three days' time, then it cannot take place at all, or must be postponed indefinitely, or that Baptism will be sought elsewhere. The plea will be made that a close relative is coming from a great distance, and has to return within a few hours, and the ceremony must be at a time to suit his arrangements. All this must be resolutely resisted. People are accustomed to give adequate notice about weddings, and Baptisms are no less important than weddings. For a priest to surrender in this matter is to let it be known that he too thinks that Baptism may well be accommodated to personal and family convenience.

(*b*) *Instruction of Parents.* On receiving notice of a request for Baptism, the parish priest will arrange to meet the parents at an early opportunity. Usually this will have to be at their home in evening. But if they have a reliable baby-sitter, it can well be at the church, the parish hall or the rectory. Instruction will be given, possibly over a cup of coffee or tea. If the parents are churchpeople, they will already have heard sermons on Baptism on church, and there need be no more than a reminder to them of its significance, and possibly a discussion of any questions they have to raise. Ife the parents are not regular churchgoers there should be a simple and short instruction about the meaning of Baptism, and a straight but courteous reminder that the Christian life of the child depends greatly on the Christian life of the parents. There should be no hint of any threat

that unless they promise to attend church the baby will not be baptized; nevertheless it can be made clear that they are expected to become responsible members of the Church. There may well be a discussion about ways and means by which parents may take a responsible part in the life of the Church when they have a young family.

In a parish in which there are many Baptisms this plan will mean that the parish priest will need to set aside one evening of the week for the instruction of parents with some regularity. The instruction need not be long, and indeed the whole interview should not be allowed to exceed an hour. But the time so spent on one evening a week, or as often as the number of Baptisms makes necessary, has a high priority on the parish priest's time.

(*c*) *Instruction of Godparents.* Whenever possible godparents should be included in the instruction given to the parents. When they come from a distance this may not often prove possible. In such cases they should be sent a carefully prepared letter containing or accompanying a short and simple guide to the responsibilities of godparents. But in a parish where there are likely to be enough Baptisms to enable baptismal services to be held regularly, e.g., once a month, or every two months, it may be possible to profit by the experience of a large parish in London, England, and hold a gathering of all godparents on the Sunday before the Baptisms. This presupposes that the parents have received instruction in the way already described. The parish referred to is that of Southwark Cathedral. Its baptismal practice is described by the Provost (the Very Reverend George Reindorp, now Bishop of Guildford) in an article in the *Church Times* of February 26, 1960, and the part of it which relates to the instruction of godparents is reproduced here. The first item is a sample letter to godparents:

> We are glad to know that you have undertaken to be godfather to —, who is to be baptized on Sunday —. So that we may have the pleasure of meeting you and, of course, going through the service together, we invite you to come to our hall on Sunday —. We will have a cup of tea at 3.45 p.m. The whole meeting will be over by 4.45 p.m.
>
> We feel sure that you will want to do your best for your godchild, and that you will make every effort to be present at this important meeting.
>
> Unless we hear from you by — we shall look forward to welcoming you.
>
> Yours sincerely, ———, Vicar.

This is the letter sent a fortnight beforehand to every person who has entered his name and address on a baptismal form as a godparent to a baby in our parish.

The Provost goes on:

> In a central London parish the chances are that godparents may live outside London. And although a godparent sometimes lives so far off that a visit to town on two Sundays running would seem out of the question, we were surprised to find how much more rarely this in fact happened than we had expected. For although, because of the numbers involved, the actual letter was hectographed, requiring only the filling in of the details and the signature

of whichever member of the staff, priest or woman worker, had done the preliminary visiting and preparation of the parents, the invitation seemed to have a personal nature about it.

At 3.45 p.m. we are there in the parish hall to welcome them. Tea is *ready* (not just coming to the boil as so often happens in the Church of England). Sunday school teachers take off any "stray" children that have been brought with godparents. Church councillors, clergy and workers mix with our visitors, and everything is done to break the ice and make them feel at home.

On a table attractively laid out is a selection of Bibles, prayer books, cards and pamphlets suitable for godchildren—all at a very modest price.

At 4.15 p.m. everyone is invited to sit down, and on the screen is shown the S.P.C.K. film-strip *It Could Make the Difference for your Children.* The commentary by one of the clergy is concise, light-hearted and un-churchy, but carefully bringing home the point of the drawings which show so excellently, in a style that appeals to everyone, the difference between having a baby, choosing a name, the choice of godparents, etc., for Christian and non-Christian parents.

At three points in the showing of the film-strip, three two-minute talks are interspersed.

The first is by a young mother, *not* a parson's wife. The second is by a godfather, and the third by a Sunday school teacher.

It is not so much the content or fluency with which these three speakers put it over that matters. It is their sincerity. And it is quite vital that the onlookers should feel that the young mother is of the "one-of-us" class, rather than the "too-good-to-be-true" brigade. Indeed, the most effective speech I remember was that of a young mother who got up and said: "I have got three children under five and—er—er—I have forgotten all the things I wanted to say—all I know is—it is a bit of a struggle to get them to church in time—but er—my husband and I manage it somehow, and off we all go together—and er —well, that's it." (How right she was—"off we all go together.")

When the film is over, the Vicar thanks everyone for coming, says how important a day next Sunday will be, and bids them all goodbye. Time limit for the whole performance from start to finish—one hour.

(*d*) *The Service.* The service itself, like every service, should be conducted with great care and reverence. Whilst it is always important to say the prayers in a clear and audible voice so that the people may follow, it is so especially in conducting Baptisms.

The second rubric for "The Ministration of Holy Baptism" must be taken seriously. In the Canadian revision of 1959 it reads: "It is fitting that Baptism should be administered upon Sundays and other Holy-days at a public service, so that the congregation may witness the receiving of the newly baptized into the number of Christ's Church." In the past this rule has had all too little attention paid to it. Here Anglicans can learn from other churches like the Presbyterian which, maintaining a strong biblical doctrine of Baptism (entry into the Covenant, and incorporation into Christ), attach much importance to the idea of Baptism as an act of the Church and not solely of the minister. Baptism must therefore be "in the face of the congregation." But it may be thought unwise to make the baptismal service part of the regular Sunday service, especially if Baptisms

are frequent in the parish. In this case some other time should be set, and arrangements made to have an adequate representation of the whole congregation present in the persons of a churchwarden or sidesman and chosen members of the various parish groups—men's, women's and young people's organizations, Sunday School teachers and children, and choir. Members of all these groups may well be taught that to take this representative role at baptismal services is an important and privileged part of their function as members of groups which are integral parts of the whole Church.

Whether there can be a hymn or not will depend on circumstances. If there can, it should be at the beginning, and should be some very well known children's hymn. At the beginning of the service (after the hymn if there is one) there should be a very short and carefully prepared talk on Baptism. It should last not more than three minutes. Its purpose will be to recall to the minds of the parents and godparents the things in which they have already been recently instructed. A brief word to the godparents should be added, making clear to them in the Prayer Book or on the service card the part they are to say, and reminding them that they are expected to do so in a clear voice.

(*e*) *Post-baptismal care.* With the conclusion of the service, the filling in of the register and the signing of baptismal certificates, in all too many cases in the past the contact between the parish priest and the family has ended. This is the main reason why there is so large a difference in numbers between those who are baptized and those who become communicants. The parish priest should, therefore, regularly visit the home, thus showing that the Church is vitally interested in the child, and that the time when the child can begin to take an active part in the life of the parish by attending the Sunday School is eagerly awaited. These visits should not be so frequent as to be bothersome to the family, but frequent enough to keep the parents "on their toes." In some places (it is frequent in the Church of Scotland) the Sunday School, or possibly the Women's Society, has a "Cradle Roll" department or guild which carefully keeps a list of all pre-Sunday School babies and arranges regular visits to their homes.

(*f*) *Anniversaries of Baptisms.* At each anniversary of the Baptism a card should be sent to the home through the mail. Church publishing firms have such baptismal anniversary cards, differently worded for each year. The "Cradle Roll" guild, mentioned above, would appropriately organize this. At the proper age, the card will be accompanied by an invitation to the Sunday School. The subject of Sunday School will make another discussion with the parents necessary.

If some such system as this is set in motion in the parish, nobody will for very long remain under the impression that Baptism is unimportant, and merely on the fringe of Christian teaching and practice. The congregation as a whole will be drawn in to take its part in this ministry, and as time goes on family after family in the parish will be influenced. Baptism

will come to be honoured, as it should be, as one of the great sacraments of the gospel.

But it will be clear that a lot of time will be demanded of the parish priest. This is especially true if the parish is a large one in which there will be many Baptisms. On the other hand, in a large parish the help of the laity should be more readily available in such matters as the sending out of the letters to godparents and the baptismal anniversary cards, and some of the visiting. But whether or not he can count on much help, the parish priest must consider very carefully what the priorities are. When he comes to a parish a great many things may confront him as urgent, apart from what may be called his basic duties of preaching the Word, administering the Sacraments and attending to the sick. The men's group may need taking in hand; the women's work may need organizing; something may need to be started for the young adults and the boys and girls. And then there is the visiting. There may be six or seven hundred names on the parish list; many rows of houses may be waiting to be investigated. Can the priest do all this? Can he possibly go from door to door of all these houses? He cannot. Let him then begin with the families which bring their children for Baptism. Within a short time he will find this opening out into a sufficiently exacting programme of visitation. Both theologically, and as a matter of pastoral strategy, it is right that instruction for Baptism, the administration of this sacrament, and the visiting which springs out of it, should be the centre of the parish priest's pastoral work.

Notes and Comments

JOHN MEDLEY ON IRISH CHURCH DISESTABLISHMENT: AN UNPUBLISHED LETTER

Some time ago, in this journal, I tried to show how one of the great Canadian Anglican churchmen of the last century had represented the liberal church-state theory typical of the newer Anglo-Catholicism, in contrast to the older "high and dry" churchmanship.[1] I have recently found a letter from Medley to W. E. Gladstone on the projected disestablishment of the Church of Ireland, which sheds some light on Medley's standpoint.[2] My purpose here is simply to present that letter with brief introductory notes.

I

The context of the letter is Gladstone's campaign for Irish Church disestablishment. Early in 1865 Gladstone began to work for the abolition of Anglican privileges in Ireland, in the hope of improved relations between the British government and the Roman Catholic majority of the Irish people. On 13 February he wrote to Sir Robert Phillimore: "I would treat the Irish church, as a religious body, with the same respect and consideration as the church of England, and would apply to it the same liberal policy as regards its freedom of action. But I am not loyal to it as an establishment."[3] After a period of discreet exploration, he overthrew the Disraeli ministry and won the general election of 1868 on a platform of disestablishment and partial disendowment of the Church of Ireland—a platform which he implemented the next year against strong conservative and ecclesiastical opposition.

Gladstone's biographer notes the contrast between this victorious policy and his opposition to financial reform of the Irish Church in 1835–1836. "What is extraordinary in the career of this far-shining and dominant character of his age, is not a development of specific opinions on dogma, or ordinance, on article or sacrament, but the fact that with a steadfast tread he marched along the high anglican road to the summits of that liberalism which it was the original object of the new anglicans to resist

1. "A Tractarian Patriarch: John Medley of Fredericton," *CJT*, 6 (1960), 15–24.
2. The letter, dated at Fredericton, 15 April 1869, is preserved in the British Museum, Add. MS. 44,420 (Gladstone Papers, Vol. 335), fol. 120–123.
3. John Morley, *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone* (New York, 1903), II, 141. Cf. Gladstone's letter of 16 April 1865 to his eldest son, W. H. Gladstone (*ibid.*, p. 159f.). For Pusey's commendation of Gladstone's work for the freedom of the English Church, cf. H. P. Liddon, *Life of Edward Bouverie Pusey*, IV (London, 1898), 199f.

and overthrow."[4] I suggest that this apparently paradoxical statement discloses the secret of Gladstone's development. As Morley himself notes, the English "catholic revival" was essentially a religious movement, clearly distinct from the continental "catholic counter-revolution" with which it is often too closely linked.[5] In fact, Gladstone's passage from the still rather conservative churchmanship of *The State in its Relations with the Church* (1838) to his mature policy is intimately associated with the clarification of Tractarian thinking under the pressure of events from 1833 onwards. If Keble's "National Apostasy" sermon of 14 July 1833 is still reminiscent of the "Throne-and-Altar" polemics of Queen Anne's time,[6] the Anglo-Catholics soon dissociated their claim for the spiritual authority of the church from the least reliance on state support. Medley's letter is interesting as an expression of this independent churchmanship in the light of a realistic appraisal of the Irish and Canadian scenes.

II

My dear Sir,

Having read, not without indignation, the accusations of "sacrilegious robbery["], "petty larceny", & even "murder", hurled against you by some who ought to know better than to make use of such violent and unchristian expressions, it seems to me the duty of every one who has the happiness of knowing you, to assure you, as I now take the liberty of doing, of my full belief in the righteousness & justice of your measure in respect to the Irish Church. I rejoice to see that one just & liberal opponent has been able to give credit for pure intentions & honourable motives.[7] Were the Irish character at all like the American, I should be as sanguine as you appear to be, of the good that the Irish Church itself may derive from the result. But the line which the great body of the nobility & the Bishops are taking is not very reassuring. Still, I trust that the House of Lords may be induced not to reject the Bill.[8] Our Church in N. Brunswick is, in one respect, in the same position with the Irish, that it forms a small fraction of the population, & that the Irish & French are a majority of our people. And if our's were a dominant Church, with large absentee landed proprietors, & the evil could not be remedied, we should be an[n]exed to the United States in a year.[9] Unhappily, I never yet knew *one* Irishman from the North of Ireland, who had any notion of the Church but as a State engine framed for the purpose of paying him to be a Protestant: nor have I ever known one such person, who was willing charitably to allow to R. Catholics due credit for the immense exertions they make to maintain their own religion, unaided by foreign help.

I think the success of your scheme will, under Providence do us all good, & shake us into a little selfreliance.[10] It is perhaps scarcely right for me to intrude upon your time, when such important interests daily & hourly press upon you. But if the sincere expression of the convictions of one mind, not mixed up

4. Morley, *op. cit.*, I, 153.
5. *Ibid.*, 159.
6. Cf. Owen Chadwick, *The Mind of the Oxford Movement* (London, 1960), 33.
7. I have no evidence for the identity of this opponent.
8. Cf. Morley, *op. cit.*, II, 266ff.
9. A note in Gladstone's hand, dated 9 May 1869, directs that the last two sentences should be sent to Lord Granville, then Colonial Secretary, for his information.
10. Cf. E. R. Fairweather, *art. cit.*, 22f.

with the political questions of the day, may be of the smallest comfort to you, & the little rill may trickle towards the same course with the full river, my word shall not be withheld; & I feel assured that you will kindly excuse what is kindly intended.

Believe me
My dear Sir
With great esteem & respect
Yours very faithfully
JOHN FREDERICTON

EUGENE R. FAIRWEATHER

Trinity College
Toronto

CONTRIBUTIONS to this new section of the journal will be welcomed from our readers. Exegetical or historical notes, brief expositions, comments on published articles, etc., are solicited.

The Distinctive Character of Hebrew Thought

A Review Article

WALLACE I. WOLVERTON

Hebrew Thought Compared With Greek. By THORLIEF BOMAN. London: S.C.M. Press (Toronto: Ryerson Press), 1960. Pp. 224. $4.25.
A Study of Hebrew Thought. By CLAUDE TRESMONTANT. New York: Desclee Co., 1960. Pp. xx, 178. $4.15.

THIS subject, as Boman says, "is in the air of our day." Systematic theology is often criticized by the biblical theologian on the ground that its categories are Greek and not suitable for the expression of biblical revelation. The systematic theologian may protest this off-hand treatment of his science. Certainly there is need for a synthesis. The two books herein reviewed should do much to define the areas where translation of Semitic ideas into Western categories is possible, difficult, and impossible. Both of them are translations, Boman's *Das Hebräische Denken im Vergleich mit dem Griechischen* (1954) by Jules L. Moreau, and Tresmontant's *Essai sur la pensée hébraïque* (1956) by Michael Francis Gibson. Boman's work will be of special interest to those familiar with Hebrew and Greek. Quite a bit of it will be lost to the reader who does not know both biblical languages, but it may still be read with great profit; and the present reviewer would hope that theologians, scholars and pastors would be led to remedy their linguistic deficiencies through the reading of this book, or at least learn reasonable caution in dealing with biblical categories of thought. Tresmontant's work does not require so much familiarity with the languages of the versions. The approach is philosophical and succeeds remarkably well in presenting to the non-hebraist some of the distinctive Old and New Testament thought forms.

To begin with Boman. He first contrasts the dynamic character of Hebrew categories with the more static thought forms of the Greeks, using Plato as his Greek representative. He approaches this task first by a study of the formal aspects of the Hebrew language as such, leaving the ideational or thought content for later treatment. This procedure is justified by the finding of modern linguistic philosophy, that languages are the expressions of thinking peculiar to peoples. "Dynamic" and "static" have been words

used to describe Hebrew and Greek thought; the contrast should be, rather, dynamic—harmonic or —resting. Hebrew verbs, even the so-called stative ones (verbs of condition or quality) imply movement. For example, *standing* implies a prior movement of arising, or of taking a position, or of alighting; dwelling may assume a prior stretching of oneself out as in encamping, or a settling down as a stranger, or a resting, or simply a sitting down. The verb of condition or quality expresses the completion of the movement or process, a kind of coming to rest. Even the verb which is so often translated by some form of *to be* (Hebrew *hayah*) frequently means *to come to be* or *become, to be present,* and even simply *to come*; it may also mean *to effect.* This verb sometimes indeed does express a kind of *being*; but for the Israelite even this being is an inner activity, not something objective or a datum at rest in itself, as it is for us and as it was particularly for the Greeks.

In Hebrew the noun clause, the subject as well as the predicate of which is a noun or noun equivalent, is much better able to express the "static" or the notion of "that which is" in its logical sense than are Greek and our modern languages with their copula and verbs of inaction: for example, "all Yahweh's ways (are) grace and truth" where Yahweh's merciful guidance is an inseparable idea—rather like our expression, "all Yahweh's gracious and true ways." Thus it would seem that within the Hebrew idiom there is the possibility of expressing something quite like Greek (and modern) notions of being. This noun clause joined with a preposition can express something quite close to our idea of existence; but, says Boman, these demonstrate a kind of local "being somewhere"; and he adds, "in Hebrew experience, noun clauses express only attributive belongingness." But this, one can perceive, is quite far from a fully developed concept of being as we find it in Plato.

Boman's discussion of impression and appearance in Hebrew thought will be a delight to the reader of the Massoritic Text. "When we observe and study a thing, we involuntarily make for ourselves an image of it somewhat analogous to a photograph." Then by words we attempt to evoke the same image in someone else. "In the entire Old Testament we do not find a single description of an objective 'photographic' appearance." The Israelite on the other hand gives impressions of the thing perceived by detailing likenesses which he draws from other realities. Both Greeks and Israelites have an intellectual motive in the experience of beauty; but the sensuous motive is different. In the Greeks the sensuous finds a tranquil, moderate and harmonious expression of the intellectual motive; the Israelite finds the beautiful "in that which lives and plays in excitement and rhythm, in charm and grace, but also and particularly in power and authority"—not in form and configuration, but in sensations.

These are very small and inadequate samplings of Boman's treatise. They are not to be taken as representative, certainly not of the wide scope of his work. There is no room here even for a sampling of his discussions

of time and space, symbolism and instrumentalism, logical thinking and psychological understanding (these phrases are all titles of sections in his book). In a concluding chapter he analyses the psychological foundation for the differences between Hebrew and Greek thought. "Rest, harmony, composure, and self-control—this is the Greek way; movement, life, deep emotion, and power—this is the Hebrew way." "For the Hebrew, the decisive reality of the world of experience was the *word*; for the Greek it was the *thing*." And "for the Hebrew the most important of his senses for the experience of truth was his hearing (as well as various kinds of feeling), but for the Greek it had to be his sight." Thus were produced physiologically and psychologically conditioned presuppositions, issuing in a unity of conceptions in each culture. Each achieved a unity and an excellence as a result of its distinctive bias.

Tresmontant does not deal with the form and structure of the Hebrew language, although he does discuss key words which show characteristic Israelite viewpoints in anthropology, psychology and epistemology. He contrasts these viewpoints with Greek (chiefly neo-Platonist) and modern thought. Such semantic discussions come, however, in the last half of his book, after he has developed a biblical metaphysics. "We have limited ourselves," he says, "to a study of the metaphysical positions that underly biblical theology." Central to a biblical metaphysics is the doctrine of creation. "To analyse the metaphysical positions of Hebrew biblical thought is to make an inventory of the content and implications of the idea of creation; to distinguish this idea from all that it is not . . . and to develop all its requirements and all its consequences." The device he employs is quite novel, if not daring. He finds in Henri Bergson's *Creative Evolution* a near approximation to Hebrew thought, and the reader is treated to an exposition of the French philosopher's position. The central theme in the first part of his book is creation and the created. While presenting Bergson he begins to introduce Hebrew notions and is able to draw out the distinctions between what is characteristically biblical and what is neo-Platonist (and modern!) with respect to time, eternity, matter, and the sensible. He is convinced (and is generally convincing in his conviction) that we have suffered great loss in our metaphysical abandonment of biblical concepts. Not that we can ever make a complete recovery of these, or that such would be desirable. But the biblical view is incarnational and sacramental in a compelling way. It is reported that this book has produced quite a stir in theological circles on the European continent.

The reviewer is not able to appraise the value of Bergson's metaphysics as such, but he must say that as Tresmontant presents him one is led to the central issues which distinguish biblical thought from Greek. The author takes leave of Bergson, however, in the latter's neo-Platonist tendency—the other current in the philosopher's mind.

The doctrine of creation, it should be noted, was a late development in Hebrew thought. In terms of the metaphysics which Tresmontant finds

implied in other aspects of Hebrew thinking it is not surprising that the doctrine, while late, ultimately emerged; so he was probably justified in centring his investigations upon it. His discussion of its implications for the meaning of Israel and the Incarnation are most stimulating.

Indeed, the reading of this book is a stimulating experience from start to finish. It may upset a few systematic theologians, particularly those who do not know or understand Aquinas and Aristotle, and it will hearten others. What will biblical theologians make of it? It will depend upon how ready they may be at this time to stand off from their biblical data and philosophize with Tresmontant.

Here are two books with rich insights for the biblical scholar on the one hand and the theologian on the other. Perhaps they will serve to introduce them to each other in a profitable dialogue.

It seems to the reviewer that Boman should have given more than passing mention to the Hebrew verb for "to know," and to its derivative, "knowledge." Tresmontant does rather better in this.

Book Reviews

The Christology of the New Testament. By Oscar Cullmann. Translated by Shirley C. Guthrie, Jr. and C. A. M. Hall. London: S.C.M. Press (Toronto: Ryerson Press), 1959. Pp. xv, 342. $8.50.

This notable volume begins by stating the Christological problem as it presented itself to the New Testament writers. We must disregard, to begin with at least, the patristic discussion of the "two natures." For the New Testament Christ's person and work together pose the question, "What is the function of Christ?"

Dr. Cullmann asserts that Jesus himself asked this question, and that his answers may be found within the witness of his believing Church, in spite of or even because of Form Criticism. Eschatological concepts were already current in Judaism, and lay to hand for the early Christians. They might also have been influenced by certain Hellenistic ideas.

The method employed to survey the evidence is analytical. Cullmann examines the exact meaning in turn of each Christological title, beginning with Judaism and, if relevant, Hellenism; then he considers if, and in what sense, Jesus may have used it about his own mission and person, and finally how the various writers of the New Testament understood it.

This might suggest that the book is to be a series of monographs like a theological dictionary, but the author says "No," there emerges one total picture of the Christ-event from his pre-existence to his final advent. The classifications are four: (i) titles that designate the *earthly* work—Prophet, Suffering Servant, and High Priest; (ii) those that relate primarily to his future, eschatological work—Messiah and Son of Man; (iii) the titles explanatory of Christ's *present* work—Lord, and Saviour; and (iv) those which chiefly explain "the work completed in his *pre-existence*"—the Word, Son of God. The title "God" is dealt with at the end of (iv), but scarcely belongs there as such. In each section where the New Testament evidence is examined, Cullmann tries to keep in mind the history of the material. Conclusions deal with the "perspectives" of the New Testament Christology.

The author insists that his work is exegetical and must be criticized on purely exegetical grounds, and for that reason an adequate review would have to be very long. He also desires that no one use the book as a work of reference, but read carefully the entire analysis of the titles before consulting the conclusion.

One ought to begin by saying quite simply that the volume is an example of the ripest scholarship. Cullmann is appreciative of Form Criticism, he uses all the methods of textual and historical study, and always does so in

the light of the best recent published material. There is very useful material in the chapter on "Jesus the Prophet," where some of the Qumran evidence is used to good effect. The author shows the limitations of this concept, and indicates why it must have seemed inadequate to the early Church. The Servant-Christology, as was already well known, he is inclined to attribute to Peter. But this too was not wholly a satisfactory account of the total work and significance of the Christ. One of the best chapters considers the title, "Son of Man," which Jesus himself employed distinctively about his eschatological and his earthly tasks. The *new* thing contributed by Jesus was precisely that the heavenly Man could become incarnate and could be the servant of the Lord (p. 161). Here he sides with Jeremias and the two Mansons against Barrett, Miss Hooker, and many other contemporary scholars. The Palestinian Hellenists held on to this idea of the Son of Man, and so does Paul in his teaching about the Last Adam. Stephen too grasped the novelty of Jesus' self-designation, and his dying exclamation represents his Lord "as witness or advocate" (p. 183).

And so one might proceed, pointing out here and there all the wealth of the exegesis and the usually very balanced treatment. We must, however, raise critical considerations.

The classes into which the titles are assigned strike one as odd. For example, the High Priest doctrine, mainly confined to Hebrews, applies primarily to the heavenly and not the earthly work of Jesus. At the moment of death he offers the one sufficient sacrifice and passes into the heavenly sanctuary, "taking his blood with him." Thereafter, as the exalted King-Priest, he continues his ministry of intercession, having been perfected by his sufferings (Heb. 2:17, 5:9–10, 6:20, 7:16, 24–28, 8:1–4, 9:11–14, 24–26, 10:11–12). Cullmann's defence is that the work of Christ as forerunner in the inner shrine is "fully subordinate" to his work of suffering what it means to be tempted, his sharing in our humanity, and then his death on earth. So be it! The texts will speak for themselves. To the reviewer they say that Christ as our High Priest made the sacrifice in his dying hour, and then for all eternity he serves at the heavenly altar.

Similarly, we may ask whether Jesus did not think of himself in the Galilean and Judaean ministry as "Messiah," albeit of a distinctive type. Surely he died as such, and before the Jewish Sanhedrin he admitted his status in ambiguous fashion. When he comes again, it will be in glory as the Saviour (Heb. 9:28; Acts 3:18–21). I would not wish to deny an eschatological overtone to the Messianic title, of course; but I question Cullmann's classification. The same must be true about "Saviour," which relates to the future at least as much as to the present; and about the "Word," which became flesh, that is, entered our present time and performed the work given him to do: to declare the Name of the Father to his elect, and to ascend the Cross of sacrifice. As for the pre-existent relation of "Son of God," how can one make that primary in light of this title's application to the King of Israel, the Messiah, to the Adam figure, and to Jesus both at his Baptism and his Transfiguration?

It is perfectly obvious that Cullman's classification is riddled with distortions of one sort or another, and it is just as clearly imposed artificially on the New Testament documents. Far better to have discussed how "Messiah" Jesus, the child of Mary, the teacher of Galilee, the healer, the man who endured the agony of the Cross but rose in triumph to become the Lord at God's right hand and regnant Head of the Church, who is still awaited as the One who comes to his ultimate victory—how this "Messiah" is defined as prophet, servant, Son, Lord (King), High Priest, Logos, God and Saviour. Yet this, only if it can be shown that there is in truth a total picture of the Christ-event in the New Testament; only, that is, if we can be sure there is a "theology" of the New Testament, and a "christology," and so on. For many scholars are prepared to argue that this is not the case. Perhaps then we had better get back to liberalism, and display the New Testament ideas and images in terms of the Synoptics, of St. Paul, of the Johannine writings, of Hebrews, and the rest of the New Testament documents.

I am dubious also about Jewish ideas of reincarnation as an explanation for the hope of the return of Elijah or the coming of a prophet like Moses (p. 33). I note that Cullmann can speak of "the end of time," when it would be safer to say, "the end of the present evil age" (p. 35). One must now be more careful about the assertion that prophecy had died out in Israel, only to return with John the Baptist and Jesus. The Qumran Scrolls, especially the Hymns, have many references to the Spirit and to the direct, immediate inspiration of the poet with the power of prophetic understanding. More too should be made of the possibility that the Jews, perhaps the Qumran covenanters chiefly, looked for the coming of an Elijah-High Priest (here I would join John 1:21 and Luke 4:9–12). Käsemann's evidence about the archangel Michael and his relation to the Melchizedek High Priest speculation may be very important (p. 85), particularly if we should tie up Michael, the paraclete of Israel, the Holy Spirit as paraclete, and Jesus himself as paraclete, advocate and intercessor. It hardly seems sufficient to get the Melchizedek idea out of Psalm 110.

In the closing chapter Cullmann personalizes the abstract with such words as these: "The New Testament itself offers no synthesis but sets out to apprehend the object of revelation from different starting points. . . . Each different concept seeks to arrive at a total understanding of the puzzle of Jesus' person and work . . ." (p. 315). He also seems to impose his own theory on the evidence, when he asserts (not for the first time) that the New Testament speaks only of the *Heilsgeschichte* line from John 1:1 (creation) to 1 Cor. 15:28 (the subjection to the Father of the whole universe, including Christ the Son). This raises the question whether all New Testament writers share this peculiar Pauline point of view. Is Cullmann correct in saying that "the reticent allusions to something beyond revelation are made on the periphery of the New Testament witness" (p. 327)? The texts to be cited include John 17:5, Ephes. 5:5, Heb. 13:8, I Pet. 3:22, II Pet. 1:11, and Rev. 22:1, 3. The point at issue

is: do any of the New Testament writers imply an eternal power and glory for Jesus Christ, in such a way that we think usefully with them about eternal distinctions within the Godhead? Or is Cullmann right, that "the Father and the Son can be meaningfully distinguished only in the time of revelatory history?" By this we have to mean, does Cullmann properly present the basic New Testament doctrine in those words? So we would have to ask if the ascended Christ does enjoy the pre-existent glory once more, and do the Father and the Logos-Son remain in some genuine duality as well as unity within their eternal Being (John 17:5, 8:58)? Does Christ rule with God in the Kingdom (Ephes. 5:5; perhaps also Col. 1:13; II Pet. 1:11, "the eternal kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ")? Is the Christ really the same . . . for ever (Heb. 13:8)? Is I Pet. 3:22 just a primitive, pre-Pauline formula built up out of Ps. 110, or did the early Church believe that Jesus the Messiah reigns "at the right hand of the Father?" Paul modified the idea; did anyone else? In the New Jerusalem John saw "the throne of God and of the Lamb," and there is no suggestion that this throne is a temporary location for the Lamb (Rev. 22:1, 3). It is another matter entirely if one goes on to enquire how far such apocalytic imagery can truly convey the revelation of ultimate truth or reality. Paul may have been wise to teach that the Son is the revealer of the Father to mankind, and that his reign will come to an end, that he is the First-Born. But the Church has, on the whole, not been satisfied with anything less than eternal Sonship for the Logos or Word, or for less than eternal Power for the Spirit of God. Here our question is exegetical. Do some New Testament writers, not to be despised, point to the view that Christ abides for ever as the "I AM," the Purpose of God, the Image of the Father, and that once for man's salvation he became man? I think there are those that do just this.

An acute critic of Cullmann has posed other problems. We should be on our guard, he thinks, against being swayed too much by the ancient Jewish eschatological concepts. They were Jewish, and they are dated. "Son of Man" may be just a dream figure of the apocalypses, not a genuine revelation from God himself. Would the man Jesus (and man he most certainly was) have considered himself in the role of an angelic figure or that of a divine being? Was there any "voice" at the Baptism or on the Mount of Transfiguration? Cullmann writes as though all this is simply to be accepted at its face value. His critics call for "de-mythologizing." I believe that these are proper questions to put to the biblical theologian. He must make up his mind whether historical criticism allows him to take the theological ideas of the documents as *prima facie* revelations of ultimate truth; and even if they tell us truly that redemption took place in Jesus Christ (in his total meaning, living, dying, rising and reigning), we are not thereby liberated from framing a Christology that goes beyond biblical categories. Thus, the Bible would provide sources and norms, but in itself it would not be the last word. Theology stems from religious experience, from the obedience of discipleship, and other factors, as well as from Scripture.

Cullmann is an exegetical theologian, and as such he renders valuable service; but he has weaknesses, chiefly because he is tempted to find unity in the New Testament where he should see variety.

The volume is well produced, with a minimum of proof-reading errors. Occasionally, as in other translations of this author's books, there are infelicities of translation-English: sentences beginning with "Also . . . ," and horrible phrases like "we by no means thereby dispute . . . ."

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Jesus the Lord: The Sovereign Authority of Jesus and God's Revelation in Christ. By Karl Heim. Translated by D. H. van Daalen. Edinburgh and London: Oliver & Boyd (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co. Ltd.), 1959. Pp. x, 192. $4.00.

Professor Karl Heim is already well-known as an instance of the rather rare combination of theologian and natural scientist. His writing is marked by a freshness and originality of thought and expression and a daring use of metaphor and analogy taken from the field of science and applied in the theological realm. One may question whether these analogies are as illuminating or as helpful as Heim evidently thinks they are, but they are stimulating and provocative of thought.

This book is the second volume of a series entitled "Christian Faith and Contemporary Thought." The basic question to which the whole book is an attempted answer has been clearly stated by the author himself in the preface to the fourth German edition: Is Jesus Christ merely a great personality of the past or is he the living Lord who can tell us with authority what we are to do about the burning questions of the present?

Part I (of four parts) deals with the negative condition for an understanding of the sovereign authority of Christ. Man cannot live without a foundation and this assumption is a trust which is not susceptible of proof because all reasoning and proof presuppose it. There are two kinds of trust: active trust which only exists during the impetus of a great action and passive trust in which we are receivers. The problem is this: How does one arrive at this second kind of trust when we mount up with wings as eagles?

Basic to Heim's thinking are two assumptions: (a) Man cannot supply a foundation for living by his own effort; (b) All human existence is governed by what he calls *polarity*. Oscillation between rest and unrest is the fundamental constitution of human life (p. 16). Every cause, authority and measure points beyond itself. Man can only find a firm footing if he can get beyond this polarity. The attempt to get beyond it, either by intellectual effort (e.g., natural theology) or mysticism (which is

dependent upon human effort), must inevitably fail (pp. 22, 36). Therefore, says Heim, God is hidden and invisible to us absolutely (pp. 28, 37). This is the non-recognizability of God.

Part II draws the inescapable conclusion. Man has no hope unless he can secure guidance by someone else, since self-guidance is manifestly impossible. Christianity came into being, not by deductions from nature and history or by means of mystical contemplation, but because a small group of people had met Jesus of Nazareth. Those who read the first volume of this series, entitled *God Transcendent*, will remember Heim's discussion of the leadership principle (*Führer-Prinzip*) as applied to Christology. Under Hitler, no doubt, this discussion was relevant and important, but leadership as such offers little real help as a principle of theological explanation—as Donald Baillie well pointed out in *God Was in Christ*. Heim's discussion of the I-Thou relationship is penetrating and helpful and firmly maintains the personal relationship between Christ and the believer. Does such an I-Thou relationship, however, mean the destruction of all personal responsibility and thought in the believer, as Heim seems to suggest on p. 46? He is so scared of any philosophic idealism which would give any validity to human thinking and values apart from Christ that he comes near to making our Lord's authority sheerly "authoritarian." This is certainly not his conscious intention but it is difficult to see how he can logically avoid it.

Part III on "Original Sin," points to the deepest reason for our need of a leader. This section can hardly be handled adequately in a brief review. The main points made are these:

(a) The reality of Satan has a central place in Jesus' view of life (p. 91);
(b) Satanic power is present in a supra-polar manner; like God, Satan is a transcendent source of evil beyond the merely empirical conflicts of persons in history;
(c) Though Satan "wills within my inner being" (p. 94), what I do is my fault.

If (a) and (b) seem in danger of ending in an ultimate dualism of God and evil in the Gnostic manner, Heim admits that these elements are logically contradictory but we must accept the tension as indispensable to the vitality of genuine faith. I suggest that it is more mystifying than enlightening to be told that the relationship of guilt and responsibility can never be fathomed because it is belongs to the supra-polar sphere.

Having shown the impotence of human thought and man's pragmatic slavery to evil, the author proceeds in Part IV to show that there is only one way out of the dilemma—the appearance of a person, a Thou, who can confront man with the absolute authority of God himself. God has given us a Leader to whom we can cleave in the ultimate questions of life. Since we cannot of ourselves break through the curse of polarity, we cannot expect to understand when one comes from beyond such polarity into our world. We can only accept the miracle (p. 148). This is affirmed in the context of an illuminating discussion of the I-Thou relationship and the nature of the

word as essentially that which the speaker must utter, not myself. We have no criteria, however, in ourselves whereby we can judge whether God has spoken or not. He himself must open our eyes and ears. Heim insists that an "I-Thou" relationship is not between a Leader and the masses but is rather a relationship of persons. This distinguishes Christ clearly from a Hitler. But if Christ is to be a "Thou" to me now in this twentieth century, then he must become in a real sense my contemporary. The author sees clearly that this can only be possible and explained through a satisfactory doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Here he has some very valuable but all too brief things to say.

It is interesting and perhaps strange to see how Heim completely ignores the questions concerning theological language and its significance which claims so much attention at the present time from Anglo-Saxon philosophers and theologians. He does not seem to be troubled by the question as to how, even with the fact of Christ before us, the Christian thinker can make valid and significant statements about God. Christ comes from beyond polarity with the answers but these have still to be expressed in language which we men must perforce derive from our experience in the world of polarity. Heim states somewhat dogmatically that the natural world is silent as far as God is concerned. Another scientist-theologian, such as Canon Raven, reaches a very different conclusion and one more congenial to this reviewer. One is also left wondering whether Heim is not in danger of falling into a new docetism. He is so concerned to make Christ an invader from beyond this world that he seems at times to do less than justice to the fact that he became truly man and genuinely lived his life within this world of polarity.

There is much that is wise, profound and deeply Christian in this book. It is open to question, however, whether its doctrine of man is truly biblical or the only basis for an adequate defence of the Lordship of Jesus.

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Jesus Christ and Mythology. By Rudolf Bultmann. London: S.C.M. Press (Toronto: Ryerson Press), 1960. Pp. 94. $1.25.

This small book is made up of lectures delivered at Yale Divinity School and Vanderbilt University in 1951. Its aim apparently is to present to "preachers and lay people" the sum and substance of Bultmann's demythologizing of the Gospel. One can therefore expect little that is new in this presentation, but rather an emphasis on themes that are now quite familiar to any reader of his previous works. This book appeals to this particular reviewer as a rather haphazard presentation, for only a few of Bultmann's dominant themes are here related. He deals with the meaning of Christ's

teaching on futuristic eschatology for modern man and finds that meaning in an emphasis on the Christian's readiness "for the unknown future that God will give." He reviews the purpose of the demythologizing process, which, stated as simply as possible, aims at removing the false stumbling blocks to the Gospel which the mythological dress of the New Testament imposes upon it, and at making plain the real stumbling block of the Gospel, which is found in its challenge to man to forsake all human securities in commitment to "the unsure beyond, in God." He again defends his appeal to existential philosophy as the one means of learning to ask the right question of the Bible—i.e., how can I discover real existence? The longest, most comprehensive, and perhaps the most satisfying section deals with the possibility of speaking of God as acting without in the process using mythological terms. Bultmann insists that we may speak of God as acting so long as we look upon God as acting not "between" but "within" historical events. This "hidden action" of God is of course known only to faith, and its result is confined solely to a fuller understanding of one's own existence. Therefore one cannot speak of God's acting in terms of cosmological eschatology but only in terms of his personal action on the individual soul.

Since neither the themes in this book nor Bultmann's treatment of them are in any important way new, this is hardly the place for a full-scale criticism of "Bultmannism" as such. Criticism would be more appropriately confined to the success or failure of the book to present to the "preacher or lay person" an adequate summary of the author's approach to the Christian faith. This I think it fails to do in large measure. It seems to me that if I were to be included in the above classification and wanted to reach the heart of Bultmann's emphases as quickly as possible, then I would want to know what this demythologizing process does to the person of Jesus Christ. There is no answer to this question in these lectures. Indeed the title itself is quite misleading, for Bultmann does not treat of the person of Christ at all, but only with the futuristic eschatology that he traces to his teaching, and that treatment is less than adequate. Certainly the book may serve as an introduction to Bultmann's thought, but the introduction will be a frustrating experience, for the questions raised will far outnumber the answers given.

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God, Grace, and Gospel. By Karl Barth. Translated by J. S. McNab. Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional Papers, No. 8. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1959. Pp. 74. 8*s.* 6*d.*

The first of these three papers, "Gospel and Law," published in 1935, was one of the earlier shots heard round the world. We are grateful for J. S. McNab's translation of this most important of Barth's smaller writings

because it gives us an intimate look at the pilot who has led twentieth-century theology between the reef of Judaistic legalism and the shoal of an Antinomian message of faith. He has shown us the Christocentric nature of the dialectic between God and man.

The problem of the tension between Law and Gospel has long been controversial. Barth has reversed the traditional order, and taught that the Law is contained in the Gospel, and that the correct order in which to conceive the subject is not Law and Gospel, but Gospel and Law. Over against Brunner's Lutheran emphasis, that, through the Law one comes to a knowledge of sin, and that the Law apart from grace is necessary, Barth has consistently maintained that to find what the Law is, we must first of all know about the Gospel. He denies that there is a law different from the Gospel by which we have to be confronted if we are to come to a knowledge of sin, be led to repentence, and made ready for the Gospel. A recent reiteration of this is found in his *Church Dogmatics*, IV: 1, p. 396: "He [the Jew who makes an abstraction of the Law] has to hear the Gospel and learn to know the true law of God, in order that he may be told by it that in trying to be in the right with God he puts himself most terribly in the wrong."

The true content of the Law is Jesus Christ in his grace. The Law is nothing else than the necessary *form* of the Gospel whose *content* is grace, and it bears witness to the grace of God. Our required conformity with that form of the Gospel, our only possible obedience to God's law, consists in our believing in Jesus Christ who, believing on our behalf, carried out once and for all what God wants from man—he fulfilled the Law. This faith of ours includes all obedience. God's grace brings to light the fact that we are sinners who are not willing to hear the Gospel in the Law. Deceived by sin, we misuse the Law for the establishment of our independent righteousness, and in our unbelief we reduce Jesus Christ to an enabling helper in our endeavour to justify ourselves. But God's unfathomable victory over our sinful misuse of the Law and our sinful unbelief restores the Law as the form of the Gospel, in its original sense as witness to the revelation of Christ. It is no longer seen as "the law of sin and death," but as "the law of the spirit of life." It has been changed from a claim upon our performance into a claim upon our trust, from the demand "Thou shalt" to the promise "Thou wilt be." Christ is the goal of the Law and the content of the Gospel.

Living theology is a constant "war of movement." It can never come to repose without becoming a frozen waterfall. Barth's theology, which many considered to be in a state of glaciation, has thawed to become a raging torrent to speed the wheels of contemporary thought. The second paper, "The Humanity of God" (September, 1956), is a report on his two revolutions, through which so many have slept. He defends the first of these, his radical Copernican revolution of the 1920's which dethroned the two-centuries-long anthropocentric liberalism where man had been magnified at the expense of God. The result was a new focus of attention upon the

Godness of God, his otherness, his abstract Kierkegaardian transcendence, at the expense of man. Barth acknowledges that this revolution was not a final word. The older doubtful humanism had contained a truth which did not get justice. The otherness of the divine over against the human made any positive relation between them impossible, and if they could touch only as a tangent touches a circle there was no place for any real incarnation. Barth now admits (and this is his greatness) that his "corrective" of twenty years ago did not do justice to the biblical theme of the *Godness* of the living God, which can have its meaning only in the context of his history and his dialogue with man and in his togetherness with him. God's Godness includes in itself his humanity. In his one person Jesus Christ is at once, as true God, man's faithful partner and, as true man, God's faithful partner. In the mirror of the humanity of Jesus Christ is revealed the humanity of God without which he is not the God of the Scriptures. God, losing no degree of his Godness, thus affirms man. The radical consequences of this Christocentrism for modern manhood, for theology, and for the Church are pointed out.

The third paper, "Evangelical Theology in the Nineteenth Century" (January, 1957), is a mellowed report on the scientific-religious-historical-philosophical anthropocentrism of the era ending in 1914. (A printer's error makes the title read "Eighteenth Century.") Though it has to do with the German-speaking world, yet it describes the pioneering we must know if we would understand the present. Barth explains his disillusionment with, and his categorical rejection of, the Schleiermacher-Ritschl-Hermann line which, as Paul Lehmann puts it, "did not find a platform in the cultural situation surrounding them adequate for launching the rocket-power of God's sovereign self-communication in Jesus Christ." Barth has revised his estimate of Schleiermacher, and now respects nineteenth-century theology's endeavour to address itself to discussion with the contemporary world, though it went too far and made this its primary task. "They have shown us how to do something which belongs to the essence of living theology." We ought to learn something from them about the relevance of revelational theology to the total life of man.

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The Sociology of Religion. By T. F. HOULT. New York: The Dryden Press (Toronto, The Macmillan Co. of Canada, Ltd.), 1958. Pp. xii, 436. $5.25.

IT IS most important that students of Christian theology should be well informed about the scientific investigation of man's religious life. We have come through a period in which good books on the anthropology and sociology of religion were scarce. Hoult's study is an indication that the

field is coming alive again. The book deals mainly, but not exclusively, with Christianity, and the major religions of the world are surveyed briefly in the appendix.

Hoult's point of view is that known as "sociocultural determinism" and "interaction," and he works with the following definition of religion: "Religion is the belief in, and the attempt to relate favorably to (a) values thought to have some transcendental importance, and/or (b) ultimate power or powers thought responsible for all, or some significant aspect of, the fundamental order of the universe" (p. 9). The chapters vary considerably in value, but each concludes with an excellent bibliography. Parts II and III, dealing with "Religion as a Social Institution" and "Religion and the other Major Social Institutions," are most worthwhile. It is questionable whether anything new is offered in this book, but it is a succinct presentation of the results of previous research and conclusions, to the point where at times the reader has the impression that it is eclectic and uncritical.

Ample evidence is offered to show that "God-concepts tend to be anthropocentric as well as anthropomorphic. That is, the concerns attributed to particular gods tend to be the concerns of those who believe in the gods" (p. 24). This of course is a patent and established fact of long standing, but the author quite uncritically applies this thesis to the god-concepts expressed in the Judeo-Christian Bible, and is apparently unaware of recent studies (e.g., G. E. Wright, *The Old Testament Against Its Environment*) and other possible interpretations.

Chapter 3 deals with "Culture Borrowing in Religion." The chapter relates many interesting facts but is a good example of the shortcomings of the merely sociological approach, and highlights the need for penetrating theological thinking in such a study. Obviously the sociologist, by his very premises, can go only so far, but that is not sufficient, however necessary and good it may be. Is one being too optimistic in suggesting that, in order to get at the real truth of what actually takes place in so-called "culture-borrowing," a critical theological appraisal is required?

Some readers of the book will undoubtedly be startled to read on pp. 105–106 that Neo-Orthodoxy is a "short-term trend" and "atypical" and that it "does not significantly contradict the long-term trend toward a decline in supernaturalism."

Hoult tries to interpret the reports of a trend towards increasing church membership and participation, and his comments are illuminating. Western religious groups, he says, "must, if they wish to gain the ear of the mass of potential adherents, pay lip service to the materialistic goals so popular today, and many religious groups are now doing just that. They are de-emphasizing supernaturalism—while attempting to show men how they can live successfully in this world" (p. 108). Religion today has become a "cult of reassurance," i.e., "a search of the middle classes for assurance that life is not as hopeless as it seems" (p. 110). Indeed, religion today caters to the utilitarian demands of the moment and "does not

defeat itself by attempting to challenge directly the spiritual skepticism which has become an increasingly important theme in Western culture" (p. 113).

Chapter 6 offers "A Sociological View of Religious Leadership." There is much here (for example, the analysis of such concepts as those of prophet and messiah) to be questioned and challenged, but valuable insights are found in the section on the "Institutionalization of Religious Leadership" (pp. 134ff.). When "functionaries" succeed "visionaries" in religion the windows into eternity become translucent and sometimes even opaque. They (the ecclesiastics) change rules from means to ends and see themselves as "guardians of sacred ritual" (p. 138).

Chapter 7 on "Religion in Rural and Urban Areas" is excellent, and Chapter 9 on "the Political Order and Religion" offers illustrations of the thesis that in religion we see reflected the prevalent political conditions. "Established religions typically spin a halo of sanctity around given political power structures" (p. 217). The major factors which influence religious-political relationships are considerations of power and sociocultural compatibility. It is a fact that majority religions usually have established prestige and power and are therefore politically conservative. But adherents of minority religious views often feel they will benefit by changes and have tried to be politically radical. Established religions have usually favoured totalitarian government, because it promises to aid them in reaching important religious goals, and have been opposed to democratic government. In the main, only minority religious groups have favoured democracy, because it alone guarantees them the freedom to propagate their views. The structure of religious institutions is usually modelled on those of pre-existing powerful governments indigenous to the areas involved. The best example here is Catholicism, which is organized almost exactly as was the powerful Roman Empire. Moreover, religious groupings composed of people with particular cultural values quite naturally reflect those values.

Chapter 10 on "The Economic Order and Religion" comments on the well known thesis that the gods men worship reflect the economic needs of the worshippers. Hoult examines the Weber-Tawney debate on Protestantism and the rise of Capitalism and joins Tawney and the critics of Weber who tend to explain the Reformation in terms of political-economic factors, for the reason that in a complex culture religion is, after all, only one current in a relatively vast sea of culture, and does more "reflecting" than "affecting."

Chapter 11 on "The Stratification Order and Religion" offers two general conclusions: (i) In any society where a stratification system is embedded in the underlying ethos, religious groupings which reject the stratification will typically remain nothing but minor "excrescences on the body politic." (ii) Sociocultural compatibility and power considerations are more important than religious ideals, as such, in determining the reaction of most members of a religious group to such phenomena as anti-Semitism.

Chapter 13 on "Science and Religion" is rather weak. Here indeed we see what can happen when a non-theological writer discusses theology. For example, Hoult naively refers to the passage in the First Epistle of John regarding the Father, Word and Holy Ghost, now omitted from the R.S.V. of the Bible, as "the cornerstone on which rests the doctrine of the Trinity" (p. 357).

In the final summary chapter, Hoult asks several significant questions. I cite but two. "If the present trend away from supernaturalism becomes fully established, will men finally be so completely motivated by individualistic goals that the only alternative to anarchy will be a world-wide establishment of totalitarian government?" (p. 385). "Since it cannot, by definition, make reference to transcendental values, to what extent can a naturalistic religion control life and behaviour?" (p. 386).

After reading the book, the reader with a theological interest is surely tempted to ask the pertinent question as to the limits within which a purely scientific treatment of religion must operate. What is radically needed in our day, along with sociological analyses, is a theology of religion.

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